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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING: NON-MEMBER STATE 
STATUS, PALESTINE AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
Zachary Saltzman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a letter dated January 22, 2009, the Palestinian National 
Authority (“PNA”) recognized the International Criminal Court’s 
(“ICC”) jurisdiction over acts committed on Palestinian territory.1 
By that time, Palestinians had sent over 200 complaints alleging 
that the Israeli military committed war crimes during Operation 
Cast Lead, including illegally using white phosphorous in densely 
populated areas of Gaza. 2   The PNA requested that the ICC 
prosecutor investigate these allegations as well as all other 
allegations of Israeli war crimes dating back to July 1, 2002.3  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Graduate of Michigan Law School 2012 and Associate at New York City law 
firm.  I am grateful to my peers at Michigan Law School who provided valuable 
feedback.  I also want to thank my wife and brother for editing and critiquing 
my argument. 
1 See John Quigley, The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal 
Court: The Statehood Issue, 35 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 1–2 (2009) (citations 
omitted) (stating that Palestine recognized the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over all crimes that occurred after the ICC statute entered into 
force); see also Wendy Bremang, Communications to the ICC Concerning the 
Situation in Gaza, THE AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COALITION FOR THE 
INT’L CRIM. CT., Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.amicc.org/docs/ Gaza.pdf 
[hereinafter AMICC Communication to the ICC] (explaining that the Palestinian 
National Authority formally recognized the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court through a letter dated January 22, 2009). 
2  See Sebastian Rotella, International Criminal Court to Consider Gaza 
Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/05 
/world/fg-court-palestinians5 (noting that the ICC received 210 requests, 
including allegations that Israel had used illegal phosphorus shells during its 
fighting with Hamas); see also Marlise Simons, Palestinians Press for War 
Crimes Inquiry on Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/world/middleeast/11hague.html?r=3&th&e
mc=th& (reporting that more than 200 requests were made with the ICC to 
review allegations of war crimes committed by Israel). 
3  See Dan Izenberg, ICC: Can PA Complain of Crimes on ‘Palestinian 
Territory’?, THE JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 21, 2010, 
http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=192194 (explaining 
that the Palestinians recognized the jurisdiction of the ICC for all crimes 
committed in Palestine since July 1, 2002); see also Simons, supra note 2 
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accusations were further examined in a UN investigation led by 
Richard Goldstone, an investigation which revealed that both 
Israeli forces and Hamas militants had engaged in war crimes.4 
Despite the PNA’s recognition of ICC jurisdiction, only 
States party to the Rome Statute are within the ICC’s jurisdiction.5 
Non-party States are not given automatic jurisdiction.6  Article 12  
§ 1 of the Rome Statute declares that a State “which becomes Party 
to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court.”7  As 
Palestine has not become a party to the Statute, it can only proceed 
under Article 12 § 3 of the Statute, which permits a non-party State 
to “accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court” if jurisdiction 
is accepted “by declaration lodged with the Registrar.”8  Because 
of the Rome Statute, the ICC prosecutor has not investigated any 
crimes committed in the Palestinian territories.  Instead, on 
October 20, 2010, the Office of the Prosecutor held a debate to 
determine whether the ICC should accept the Palestinian consent 
to jurisdiction.9  This “round table” was the culmination of many 
months of conflicting submissions to ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(providing that Palestine recognized the ICC’s jurisdiction for all acts committed 
in Palestine since July 1, 2002). 
4 See Richard Boudreaux, Israelis and Palestinians Committed War Crimes in 
Gaza, U.N. Inquiry Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/16/world/fg-mideast16 (noting that Richard 
Goldstone’s report asserted that both Israel and Palestine had committed war 
crimes while fighting); see also Bremang, supra note 1 (reporting South African 
Judge Goldstone’s statement that both Israel and Palestinian forces committed 
war crimes during the conflicts in Gaza). 
5 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12 § 1, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (establishing that any State 
that becomes a party to the Rome Statute falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC). 
6 See id.  
7 See id. 
8 See id. at § 3 (explaining that a State that is not within the purview of the 
Rome Statute may accept the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction by declaration). 
The ICC can also secure jurisdiction if the Security Council refers the Gaza 
situation to the Court. Bremang, supra note 1.  However, this is extremely 
unlikely since “the US, an ally to Israel, as a permanent member would almost 
certainly veto any such referral.” Id. 
9 See Izenberg, supra note 3; see also Jonny Paul, Amnesty Calls on ICC to Act 
on Cast Lead ‘War Crimes’, THE JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 29, 2010, 
http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=189595 (recognizing that 
many people have long awaited the ICC prosecutor’s decision regarding 
Palestine’s declaration). 
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Ocampo on the issue of accepting the Palestinian submission.10  In 
essence, the prosecutor must determine whether the Palestinian 
territories constitute a State for the purposes of ICC jurisdiction. 
This is a decision, which has not yet been made.    
The question of ICC jurisdiction over alleged Israeli war 
crimes in Palestine is further complicated now that the United 
Nations General Assembly has recognized Palestine as a non-
member state.  Palestine has had a presence in the United Nations 
since 1974 when the General Assembly first allowed Palestine to 
participate at the UN as a permanent observer.11  In this capacity, 
Palestine is recognized as an “entit[y] having received a standing 
invitation to participate in the sessions and work of the General 
Assembly and maintaining permanent observer missions at 
Headquarters.”12  Initially, the Palestinians were represented by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization.13  However, after 1988, when 
the Palestinian National Council declared Palestinian 
independence, the designation “State of Palestine” was used to 
describe the Palestinian mission at the UN.14  Over the years, the 
scope of Palestinian participation at the United Nations has grown 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Tim Hume & Ashley Fantz, Palestinian United Nations Bid Explained, 
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/28/world/meast/un-palestinian-bid/index. 
html (last updated Nov. 30, 2012, 5:38 AM) (noting that in 2012, there are still 
competing opinions as to Palestine’s request for statehood, with France, Spain, 
Portugal and Switzerland supporting the Palestinians’ bid for statehood, Britain 
and the United States opposing it); see also Izenberg, supra note 3 (finding that 
prior to the debate, numerous expert’s position papers, both supporting and 
opposing Palestine’s submission, was sent to the ICC). 
11 See Beth DeBernardi, Note, Congressional Intent and Conflicting Treaty 
Obligations: United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 23 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 83, 88–89 (1990) (citations omitted) (noting that the United Nations 
has recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization since 1974); see also 
Hume & Fantz, supra note 8 (stating that as of 1974, Palestine’s status in the 
U.N. was that of “permanent observer”). 
12 See U.N. Secretary-General, Participation of Palestine in the Work of the 
United Nations: Note by the Secretary-General (Aug. 4, 1998), 
http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/pid/11551 (noting Palestine’s 
invitation to partake in the daily work of the General Assembly).  
13 See DeBernardi, supra note 9, at 87–88 (noting that the Palestine National 
Council created the PLO in 1964); see also Kathryn M. McKinney, Comment, 
The Legal Effects of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles: Steps Toward 
Statehood for Palestine, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 93, 96–97 (1994) (finding that 
the PLO represented Palestine internationally). 
14 See generally JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE (2010). 
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such that its functions at the UN are “practically identical to that of 
an observer state.”15 
Although the UN only recently recognized Palestine as a 
non-member state, discussion of Palestine attaining that status 
began in earnest in 2011.  In September 2011, to advance the 
Palestinian claim to statehood, Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas announced that he would seek full membership at the 
United Nations, a step that would require a recommendation to the 
General Assembly by the Security Council.16  Knowing that the 
United States—which sits on that council—would veto any attempt 
to recommend statehood, Abbas announced that if his attempts 
failed he would seek to upgrade Palestine’s status from UN 
permanent observer to UN non-member State. 17   This status 
upgrade would allow Palestine to join the Holy See as the only 
other non-member State, and would confer the recognition of 
Palestinian statehood by the General Assembly.18   Unlike full 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See John Cerone, Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to 
Accord Palestine the Status of Observer State, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., Dec.. 7, 
2012, available at http://www.asil.org/insights121208.cfm (discussing the UN 
General Assembly’s progressive inclusion of the state of Palestine into the 
United Nations).  
16 See id. (stating that in September 2011, President Mahmoud Abbas applied for 
Palestine to be granted UN Member State status); see also Palestine to Seek UN 
Non-Member State Status, Abbas Tells General Assembly Debate, UN NEWS 
CENTRE, Sept. 27, 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
43083&Cr=general+debate&Cr1#.UQms2EJEOQr (noting that in September 
2011, Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas, sought full United 
Nations membership and failed).  
17 See Adam G. Yoffie, Comment, The Palestine Problem: The Search For 
Statehood and the Benefits of International Law, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 497, 499 
(2011) (citations omitted) (noting that the United States would most likely 
prevent the Security Council from giving the General Assembly a 
recommendation); see also Judi Rudoren, Year After Effort at U.N., New Aim for 
Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/ 
world/middleeast/palestinians-aim-for-nonmember-state-status-at-united-
nations-general-assembly.html?_r=0 (discussing that even though Palestine was 
denied UN membership in 2011, it is planning to seek non-member state status 
in 2012). 
18 See General Assembly, 67th Sess., 44th & 45th plen. mtgs., GA/11317 (Nov. 
29, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ 
ga11317.doc.htm (stating that the status granted to Palestine was the same as the 
status afforded the Holy See); see also Yasmin Abdullah, Note, The Holy See at 
United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1835, 1837 
(1996) (citations omitted) (discussing that the Holy See, as a Non-Member State 
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membership, an upgrade to the status of non-member State would 
only require the approval of the United Nations General 
Assembly.19  
Mahmoud Abbas’s announcement that he would petition 
the General Assembly for non-member State status set off a 
political and media frenzy.  Mahmoud Abbas fed this frenzy by 
authoring an op-ed in the New York Times in which he expressed 
his hope that statehood would “pave the way for us [Palestine] to 
pursue claims against Israel at the United Nations, human rights 
treaty bodies and the International Court of Justice.”20  Abbas’ 
hopes were raised by comments by Christian Wenaweser, 
president of the ICC assembly of State Parties, who told the Wall 
Street Journal that a Palestinian observer state would be able to 
join the ICC and bring charges against Israel.21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Permanent Observer, is considered a state, despite not being a member of the 
General Assembly). 
19 See John Cerone, The UN and the Status of Palestine – Disentangling the 
Legal Issues, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., Sept. 13, 2011, available at 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110913.pdf (stating that although 
Palestine’s bid for UN membership would most likely be unsuccessful, due to a 
veto from the Security Council, the General Assembly could contemplate 
changing Palestine’s status); see also Robert McMahon & Jonathan Masters, 
Palestinian Statehood at the UN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
http://www.cfr.org/palestinian-authority/palestinian-statehood-un/p25954#p2 
(last updated Nov. 30, 2012) (stating that a state only needs a majority vote from 
the General Assembly to attain Non-Member State standing).  
20 See Mahmoud Abbas, The Long Overdue Palestinian State, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html (stating 
that Palestine’s seeking of state recognition would allow the state to pursue 
claims against Israel at the U.N.); see also Hussein Ibish, Palestine’s U.N. 
Membership Bid: How it Could Cause an International Legal Crisis Over the 
Potential Prosecution of Israeli Officials, SLATE, Sept. 22, 2011, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/09/could_a_un
_upgrade_help_the_palestinians_prosecute_israeli_officials.html (recognizing 
that the one factor in President Abbas’ efforts to secure recognition of a 
Palestinian state at the U.N. is to give Palestine the right to bring legal action 
against Israel at the ICC). 
21 See Joe Lauria, Palestinian Options at U.N. Lead to Legal Threat to Israel’s 
Military, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424053111904060604576575002527221120.html (revealing that a 
Palestinian observer state would be able to join the ICC and seek an 
investigation into any alleged war crimes committed on Palestinian territory 
after July 2002 against Israel); see also Jordan Sekulow, Matthew Clark & 
Nathanael Bennett, The Overreach of Palestinian ‘Statehood’ at the United 
Nations, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
religious-right-now/post/the-overreach-of-palestinian-statehood-at-the-united-
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The most important comment came from Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, who commented on the significance of the 
General Assembly’s recognition of Palestine as a non-member 
observer state.  Mr. Moreno-Ocampo, who has been undecided for 
the past two years about whether or not the ICC could accept the 
PNA’s declaration of consent to ICC jurisdiction, announced: “If 
the General Assembly says they are an observer state, in 
accordance with the all-state formula, this should allow them . . . to 
be part of the International Criminal Court.”22  While this statement 
has been criticized as overstating the importance of any General 
Assembly action,23 Mr. Moreno-Ocampo’s comment suggests that 
the ICC views any General Assembly action as carrying great 
importance. 
Following what U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
described as “extremely intense” diplomacy, President Abbas 
agreed not to proceed with a General Assembly resolution until the 
Security Council agreed on a final position regarding his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nations/2012/12/07/d982435a-40a5-11e2-bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_blog.html 
(reporting that President Abbas will try to pursue charges against Israel through 
the ICC). The Assembly of State Parties, composed of representative states that 
have acceded to the Rome Statute, is the oversight and legislative body of the 
ICC. See ICC – Assembly of States Parties, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/assembly/Pages/assembly.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2013) (noting the makeup of the Assembly of States Parties).  
22  See William Thomas Worster, The Exercise of Jurisdiction by the 
International Criminal Court Over Palestine, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1153, 
1157 (2011) (citations omitted) (noting that the Palestinian declaration raised 
questions as to whether Palestine would be considered a “state” within ICC’s 
jurisdiction); see also Olivia Ward, Palestinians Could Pursue War Crimes 
Charges Without Full Statehood: ICC Prosecutor, THE STAR, Sept. 28, 2011, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1061595--palestinians-could-pursue-
war-crimes-charges-without-full-statehood-icc-prosecutor (revealing that as of 
late 2011, there was no outcome as to whether the ICC had jurisdiction over 
Palestine’s claims against Israel). 
23 See Megan A. Fairlie, Palestine’s Upgraded Status and the International 
Criminal Court, JURIST – Forum, Jan. 22, 2013, 
http://jurist.org/forum/2013/01/megan-fairlie-palestine-icc.php (opining that it 
was beyond the power of the Office of the Prosecutor to resolve the issue of 
Palestine’s statehood); see also Milan Markovic, Comment to Kevin Jon 
Heller, The Tone-Deaf ICC Prosecutor, OPINIO JURIS, (Sept. 29, 2011, 10:12 
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/29/the-tone-deaf-icc-prosecutor/ 
(questioning whether Moreno-Ocampo is putting too much weight on the 
General Assembly’s determination). 
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application for full Palestinian membership in the UN.24  Israel and 
the United States strongly opposed General Assembly recognition 
of Palestine as a non-member State out of fear that it would allow 
the ICC to proceed with Palestine’s request that the ICC 
investigate Israeli war crimes.25  However, now that President 
Abbas has succeeded in securing recognition of Palestine as a non-
member state, 26  the significance of a General Assembly vote 
upgrading Palestinian status from permanent observer to non-
member state is a pressing issue.  
This Essay argues that contrary to the opinions expressed 
by Mr. Moreno-Ocampo and others against Palestine’s request for 
ICC jurisdiction, the General Assembly recognition of Palestine as 
a non-member state would have a minimal impact on ICC 
jurisdiction over Palestinian war crime charges against Israel.  Part 
I argues that Palestine is not a state within the meaning of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  See Chronology of Events: Israel/Palestine, SECURITY COUNCIL REP., 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/ 
israelpalestine.php?page=all&print=tre (last modified Jan. 4, 2013) (noting that 
on September 23, 2011, Palestinian President Abbas submitted an application 
for membership, and that on September 28, 2011, the Security Council referred 
the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members); see also 
Flavia Krause-Jackson & Bill Varner, Palestinians Give UN Time Amid 
Pressure to Drop State Bid, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 22, 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-21/palestinian-authority-may-delay-
call-for-an-immediate-un-vote-on-statehood.html (quoting Palestinian 
negotiator, Nabil Shaath, who stated that time would be given to the Security 
Council to contemplate Palestine’s request for membership before heading to the 
General Assembly). 
25 See Markovic, supra note 21 (recognizing the U.S. and Israel’s fear that upon 
Palestine getting observer-state status, it would be able to prompt an 
investigation into the circumstances of Gaza); see also Ewen MacAskill & Chris 
McGreal, UN General Assembly Makes Resounding Vote in Favour of 
Palestinian Statehood, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 29, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 2012/nov/29/united-nations-vote-palestine-
state (reporting that Israel and the U.S. criticized the U.N.’s resolution to 
recognize Palestine as a state). 
26 See David Ariosto & Michael Pearson, U.N. Approves Palestinian ‘Observer 
State’ Bid, CNN, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/29/world/meast/ 
palestinian-united-nations/index.html  (reporting that the U.N. approved 
Palestine’s change in status from “nonmember observer entity” to “non-member 
observer state”); see also Ethan Bronner & Christine Hauser, U.N. Assembly, in 
Blow to U.S., Elevates Status of Palestine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/Palestinian-Authority-
United-Nations-Israel.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (proclaiming that the U.N. 
approved Palestine’s status as a non-member observer state). 
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international law and that the word “state” should be defined in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning.  Part II assesses the impact 
that non-member status has on Palestine’s sovereignty, and that the 
attainment of non-member status does not alter Palestine’s 
statehood, as it is traditionally understood.  Further, Part II 
concludes that only a grant of full UN membership would affect 
Palestine’s statehood as it relates to ICC jurisdiction.   
 
I. Definition of Statehood Under Article 12(3) 
 
Whether the International Criminal Court can assert 
jurisdiction over Palestine’s charges turns on the answer to two 
questions: First, is Palestine a state under the generally-accepted 
definition of “state” in international law?  Second, should the ICC 
define the term “state” as used in Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute 
in accordance with its traditional meaning under international law? 
Affirmative answers to these questions support ICC jurisdiction. 
First, if Palestine is a state, it is entitled to accept ICC 
jurisdiction through a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute. 27  Therefore, the ICC could accept jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in the Palestinian territories. Second, if Article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute is not constrained by the traditional definition of 
“state” in international law, Palestine could also have ICC 
jurisdiction.28  This argument proposes that the word “state” should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See AMBASSADOR DORE GOLD & DIANE MORRISON, AVERTING PALESTINIAN 
UNILATERALISM: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE RECOGNITION 
OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AS A PALESTINIAN STATE 6 (2010) 
(acknowledging that Palestine invoked Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute when 
seeking the ICC’s jurisdiction); see also Kevin Jon Heller, Yes, Palestine Could 
Accept the ICC’s Jurisdiction Retroactively, OPINIO JURIS, Nov. 29, 2012, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/11/29/yes-palestine-could-accept-the-iccs-
jurisdiction-retroactively/ (reiterating that Palestine can accept the ICC’s 
jurisdiction through the Rome Statute’s Articles 11(2) and 12(3)). 
28 See Dapo Akande, ICC Assembly of States Parties Urged to Decide on Status 
of Palestine, EJIL: TALK!, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-assembly-
of-states-parties-urged-to-decide-on-status-of-palestine/ (quoting the Prosecutor, 
who was suggesting that the term “state” in Article 12 is defined by the U.N. 
Secretary General); see also Michael Kearney & Stijn Denayer, Al-Haq Position 
Paper on Issues Arising from the Palestinian Authority’s Submission of a 
Declaration to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court under Article 
12(3) of the Rome Statute, AL-HAQ, ¶ 21, Dec. 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.alhaq.org/attachments/article/273/position-paper-icc-
(14December2009).pdf (demonstrating that the term ‘“state”’, as used in the 
Rome Statute, may be different from its meaning within international law). 
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be interpreted not in accordance with its standard definition under 
international law but instead with reference to the object and 
purpose of the treaty.29  Using this approach, the ICC would make 
an independent determination as to whether it should consider 
Palestine a state for purposes of the Rome Statute.  The crux of this 
argument is that the definition of “state” for purposes of Article 
12(3) of the Rome Statute does not require statehood at all, but 
only the necessary “capacity” to transfer its jurisdiction to the 
ICC.30  
This Part argues that the Palestinian Authority’s declaration 
under 12(3) does not provide the ICC with jurisdiction over alleged 
Israeli war crimes committed in Palestinian territories. Section I.A 
argues that Palestine is not a state under the traditional 
international law definition.  Section I.B argues that, for the 
purposes of determining ICC jurisdiction, the traditional 
international law definition of a state is the correct one.  Finally, 
Section I.C rebuts the argument that the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction over Palestine on the basis of Palestine’s capacity to 
enter treaties and bring criminal charges.  
 
A. Palestinian State Status Prior to General Assembly 
Recognition 
 
Statehood is determined using the traditional requirements 
of the Montevideo Convention,31 and to a degree, the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Malcolm N. Shaw, The Article 12(3) Declaration of the Palestinian 
Authority, the International Criminal Court and International Law 6 (Mar. 10, 
2011) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1782668 (noting that there is an issue as to whether 
“state” should be defined according to international law or according to the 
interpretation of the statute as a whole); see also Chantal Meloni, Palestine and 
the ICC: Some Notes on Why It is Not a Closed Chapter, OPINIO JURIS, Sept. 25, 
2012,http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/25/palestine-and-the-icc-some-notes-on-
why-it-is-not-a-closed-chapter/ (discussing that the term “state” in Article 12(3) 
should be defined with regard to Article 12(1) of the ICC statute). 
30 See Kearney & Denayer, supra note 26 (demonstrating that the definition of 
“state” can simply mean having the ‘“capacity’” to “transfer jurisdiction to the 
court”). 
31 See Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and 
its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 413–14 (1999) (citations 
omitted). 
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recognition of a State’s existence.32  Employing the traditional 
definition, Palestine was not a state prior to the United Nations 
General Assembly’s declaration. Moreover, the two main 
arguments made before the ICC in favor of Palestinian statehood 
fail because they abandon the consensus definition of statehood 
and because they are unpersuasive under their own alternative 
criteria.33 
 
1. Statehood Prior to General Assembly Declaration 
 
The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 
contains the most commonly accepted formulation for statehood.34 
Under the Montevideo Convention a state must possess “(a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.” 35   The 
Montevideo Convention enshrines the declaratory theory of 
statehood.  The declaratory theory argues that recognition of a state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The criteria of the Montevideo Convention are flexible depending on the 
strength of recognition and other factors such as exercising the right to self-
determination. See id. at 446–47 (noting that there are other criteria for 
statehood in addition to those elicited in the Montevideo Convention, including, 
though debatable, recognition).  
33  This paper does not address a third major argument, namely that the 
declaration of 1988 was not a declaration of a new state, but the declaration of a 
state that existed since the mandatory period. This third argument “is based on a 
series of legally disconnected steps and distortions of the historical record.” See 
Malcolm N. Shaw, In the Matter of the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court with Regard to the Declaration of the Palestinian Authority, 
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS ON WHETHER THE DECLARATION LODGED BY THE 
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY MEETS STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, ¶ 12 
(Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B1-
ACC0-B41706BB41E5/283639/SupplementaryOpinionMalcolmShaw2010.pdf 
(explaining the “distortion of the historical record”). See generally HOWARD M. 
SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR TIME (3d 
ed. 2007) (detailing the history of the mandatory period). 
34 See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (6th ed. 2008) (citations 
omitted) (outlining the Montevideo Convention qualifications); see also J. D. 
van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 9, 12 
(1991) (citations omitted) (explaining that the declaratory theory, consisting of 
the Montevideo Convention requirements, is widely accepted). 
35 See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, available at avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp 
(noting the four qualifications under the Montevideo Convention); see also 
Grant, supra note 29, at 414 (1999) (citations omitted) (discussing the four 
criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention).  
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is not the operative factor in the creation of a state.36  Rather, a 
state exists whether it is recognized or not depending on whether it 
meets certain requirements.37  
Experience with decolonization and the rise of 
independence movements has complicated the use of Montevideo 
Convention in determining statehood, and its four criteria are no 
longer considered the exclusive and determinative hallmarks of 
statehood.38  Rather than focus on a mechanical application of the 
four Montevidean criteria, the determination of statehood must 
also consider the degree of internal control over a territory free 
from outside influence39 and to some degree, recognition.40   
This Essay does not re-evaluate whether Palestine is a state 
under the traditional consensus definition of statehood.  Rather it 
relies on the consensus analysis of international law scholars who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State 
in State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115, 118 (2009) (citations 
omitted) (recognizing that the declaratory theory does not equate recognition 
with status).  
37 See Dimitrios Lalos, Note, Between Statehood and Somalia: Reflections of 
Somaliland Statehood, 10 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 789, 797–98 (2011) 
(citations omitted) (describing the requirements for statehood under the 
declaratory theory); see also M. Kelly Malone, Comment, The Rights of Newly 
Emerging Democratic States Prior to International Recognition and the Serbo-
Croation Conflict, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 81, 91 (1992) (citations omitted) 
(declaring that under the declarative theory, recognition is separate and 
independent from a state’s “international legal personality”). 
38 See James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too 
Soon, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 307, 309 (1990) (posing that one should look at state 
independence rather than at the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention to 
determine whether statehood exists); see also Grant, supra note 29, at 434 
(stating that scholars are now questioning the validity of the Montevideo criteria 
in establishing statehood because the criteria are over-inclusive). 
39 See Crawford, supra note 36, at 309 (noting that territories of an organized, 
self-governing community may fall short of meeting the first requisite of the 
Montevideo Convention); see also Alison K. Eggers, When is a State? The Case 
for Recognition of Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 211, 215 (2007) 
(proposing that international law emphasizes the importance of state integrity 
and that sovereign states should decide the disposition of national territory). 
40 See SHAW, supra note 32 (conveying the idea that the four requirements of 
statehood in the Montevideo Convention are not exhaustive, with self-
determination and recognition as other important factors); see also Milena 
Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, 39 DEN. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 209, 210 (2011) (adding that subparts to the four pillars of 
the Montevideo Convention exist, including recognition by regional partners and 
powerful states). 
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apply the traditional definition of statehood.  Applying the 
traditional criteria, the consensus among international scholars is 
that Palestine is not a state.  Simply put, “Palestinian statehood has 
clearly not been accepted by the international community” because 
Palestine does not meet the requirements for statehood. 41   In 
addition, scholars focusing on the ICC also do not recognize 
Palestine as a state.  William Schabas, in his Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court, made clear that Palestine is not a 
state.42 In discussing the possibility of ICC jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in the Palestinian territories he noted that, “Palestine is 
not generally recognized as an independent state.”43  He concluded 
that “before Palestinian independence” the ICC could only exercise 
jurisdiction if it determined that the West Bank was still Jordanian 
territory and thus could exercise jurisdiction through Jordanian 
acceptance ICC jurisdiction.44   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Crawford, supra note 29, at 309 (commenting that though the PLO 
exercises considerable influence over its occupied territory, this control falls 
short of constituting an organized, self-governed community); see also SHAW, 
supra note 32, at 247 (claiming that the Palestinian Authority now possesses 
limited international personality though the international community does not 
accept it as a state). 
42 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 87 (4th ed. 2011) (mentioning that Palestine is not a member 
state of the UN and that its article 12(3) claim under the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court is debatable); see also William Schabas, Assembly 
of State Parties Should Consider Palestine State Issue, HUM. RTS. DOCTORATE 
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2003, 2:53 PM), http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com 
/2012/09/assembly-of-states-parties-should.html (adding that the International 
Criminal Court should decide whether Palestine should be recognized as a state). 
43 See SCHABAS, supra note 40, at 87–88 (opining that even if Palestine became 
a state in the future, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court would 
still be in dispute); see also William Schabas, Palestine Should Accede to the 
Rome Statute, HUM. RTS. DOCTORATE BLOG (Jan. 25, 2003, 2:36 PM), 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2011/11/palestine-should-accede-to-
rome-statute.html (noting that though Palestine was admitted as a member of 
UNESCO, it can still take a number of steps to further its chances of gaining 
recognition as a state). 
44  See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 81 (3rd ed. 2007) (noting that, prior to the independence of 
Palestine, the International Criminal Court may only exercise jurisdiction over 
Palestinian territory by its connection to the neighboring state of Jordan); see 
also Daniel A. Blumenthal, Recent Development: The Politics of Justice: Why 
Israel Signed the International Court Statute and What the Signature Means, 30 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 593, 612 (2002) (determining that ICC jurisdiction may 
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Additionally, internal Palestinian documents as well as 
interactions with other states indicate “systematic Palestinian 
resolve not to declare and establish a Palestinian state” until peace 
talks with Israel were successfully concluded.45  The Palestinian 
Authority has repeatedly declared its intention to assert Palestinian 
independence.46   Yet, throughout the Oslo Peace Process and 
subsequent negotiations Palestinian leadership acknowledged the 
absence of Palestinian independence. 47   Indeed, during Oslo, 
Palestinian leadership promised to take no steps to change the non-
state status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip until negotiations 
were completed.48  The “Roadmap to Peace” further speaks of a 
future Palestinian state.49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
extend to certain territories because of their relation to signatories of the ICC 
statute). 
45 See Daniel Beoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine, and the ICC, 32 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 73, 97 (2010) (demonstrating the existence of Palestinian documents, 
which indicate that the Palestinian leadership would not seek independent 
statehood without formal recognition by Israel); see also Steven Erlanger, Abbas 
Declares War with Israel Effectively Over, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at A1 
(publishing statements of the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas declaring that 
he would prefer prolonged negotiations on permanent statehood for Palestine 
rather than obtaining immediate preliminary statehood status without Israel 
guarantees). 
46  See Beoliel & Perry, supra note 43, at 98−100 (establishing numerous 
examples of Palestinian attempts to achieve independence in recent decades); 
see also John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties?, 
30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 717, 726 (1997) (providing an example of the Palestinian 
leadership pursuing independence for Palestine from Israel). 
47 See George E. Bisharat, The Legal Foundations of Peace and Prosperity in 
the Middle East: Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal Reform in 
Palestine, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 253, 260−61 (1999) (asserting the lack of 
recognition of Palestinian independence following the Oslo Accords); see also 
Michael M. Karayanni, The Quest for Creative Jurisdiction: The Evolution of 
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine of Israeli Courts Toward the Palestinian 
Territories, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 665, 668 (2008) (holding that it is generally 
accepted by the parties to the Oslo Peace Process that Palestine lacks 
independence). 
48  See Charles F. Martel, Give Peace a Chance: How Considering Peace 
Process Obligations Would Have Improved the Rulings of the International 
Court of Justice and the Israeli Supreme Court on the Israeli Security Barrier, 
17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 305, 321−22 (2007) (outlining that the general 
agreement made between Israel and Palestine in the Oslo Accords does not to 
alter the territorial status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip); see also 
Malcolm N. Shaw, The Article 12(3) Declaration of the Palestinian Authority, 
The International Criminal Court and International Law, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
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These statements make clear that Palestinian leadership did 
not consider Palestine to be an independent entity. Instead, it saw 
itself negotiating towards independence. It is axiomatic that absent 
independence, a state cannot exist. 50   Since Palestine did not 
consider itself to be an independent state, other state actions with 
regard to the Palestinian Authority are of no significance.51 
The position that the Palestinian National Authority does 
not consider Palestine an independent state is of crucial importance 
to the argument that Palestine is not a state.  The lack of self-
recognition cuts off a discussion of the Montevideo criterion at the 
outset.  If the 1988 declaration was ineffective and if the PNA does 
not now consider itself a state, then the question of statehood is 
answered at the outset.  Thus opponents of ICC jurisdiction over 
crimes committed in the Palestinian territories have acknowledged 
that, “[t]here is no doubt that the PNA is very close to becoming a 
state . . . However, at the time of the declaration in question the 
Palestinian leadership does not assert statehood.”52  These scholars 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301, 307−08 (2011) (describing the pledge made by Palestinian leadership to 
Israel to not alter the territorial status of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip). 
49 See Shaw, supra note 46, at 309−10 (detailing the future of a hypothetical 
Palestinian state as held in the “Roadmap to Peace”); see also Justus Reid 
Weiner & Diane Morrison, Legal Implications of “Safe Passage” Reconciling a 
Viable Palestinian State With Israel’s Security Requirements, 22 CONN. J. INT’L 
L. 233, 268−69 (2007) (explaining the Roadmap’s step-by-step process for an 
independent Palestine). 
50 See Crawford, supra note 36, at 309 (arguing that it is preferable to look to a 
state’s independence as a prerequisite for statehood); see also Robert A. Caplen, 
Rules of “Disengagement:” Relating the Establishment of Palestinian Gaza to 
Israel’s Right to Exercise Self-Defense as Interpreted by the International Court 
of Justice at the Hague, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 679, 704 (2006) (emphasizing that 
Palestine’s inability to independently offer decisions and resolutions for a vote 
supports the conclusion that it is not a state). 
51 See Robert Weston Ash, Is Palestine a “State?” A Response to Professor 
John Quigley’s Article, “The Palestine Declaration to the International 
Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue,” 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 186, 193 (2009) 
(stating that because a sovereign Palestine “State” does not currently exist, 
Palestine does not exercise sovereign authority over territories in the Gaza Strip 
or the West Bank); see also Major Joshua L. Kessler, The Goldstone Report: 
Politicization of the Law of Armed Conflict and Those Left Behind, 209 MIL. L. 
REV. 69, 95–96 (2011) (explaining that because Palestine authority has shown 
an unwillingness to pursue a unilateral route to statehood and no lasting political 
compromise exists, it is not clear if it retains sovereignty of the territories). 
52 See Yael Ronen, ICC Jurisdiction over Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip: Art. 
12(3) of the ICC Statute and Non-State Entities, 8(1): 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 234, 
239 (2010) (acknowledging that the PNA is very close to becoming a state but at 
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do not admit that statehood necessarily follows from Palestinian 
assertion of statehood.  They do, however, place great importance 
on the absence of such a declaration in arguing that the ICC cannot 
accept jurisdiction pursuant to the Palestinian request.53 
 
2. Statehood Through Declaration and International 
Recognition 
   
Despite the general consensus that Palestine is not a state, 
several scholars have argued that Palestine is a state by relying on 
alternative definitions of statehood or misapplying the traditional 
criteria.  Professor Quigley, for example, argues that Palestine 
became a state in 1988.  In that year, the Palestine National 
Council declared “‘the establishment of the State of Palestine in 
the land of Palestine with its capital in Jerusalem.’”54  Following 
this declaration, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution recognizing the proclamation of an independent 
Palestinian state by a vote of one-hundred four yeses, forty-four 
abstentions and 2 nos.55  Further, Professor Quigly argues, the 
United Nations implicitly signaled its recognition of a Palestinian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this point Palestinian leadership does not assert statehood); see also SHAW, 
supra note 32 (noting that despite the State of Palestine’s declaration in 
November 1988, it is not regarded as a valid state since Palestinian 
organizations were not in control of any part of the territory they claimed). 
53  See Worster, supra note 20, at 1207 (discussing that membership and 
acceptances of jurisdictions of the Rome Statute of the ICC are limited to 
“states,” and the criteria of Palestine satisfying the conditions for statehood are 
clearly not met); see also Larry D. Johnson, Palestine’s Admission to UNESCO: 
Consequences Within the United Nations?, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 118, 
126 (2011–2012) (indicating that the Rome Statute of the ICC allows States, not 
Parties, to the Rome Statute to accommodate acceptances of jurisprudence). 
54 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that it was in the 1988 declaration that 
Palestine proclaimed its establishment as a state); see also John Quigley, 
Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 776 (1996) (commenting 
that in 1988, the Palestine National Council declared a Palestinian state with its 
capital at Jerusalem). 
55 See Quigley, supra note 1 (indicating that there were one hundred and four 
votes for the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, two votes 
against it and forty-four abstentions); see also Dore Gold, Israel, the 
Palestinians, and the UN General Assembly, ISREALSEEN.COM (May 4, 2011), 
http://israelseen.com/2011/05/04/israel-the-palestinians-and-the-un-general-
assembly-dore-gold/ (recognizing that the 1988 UN General Assembly 
resolution was backed by one hundred and four countries, with only the United 
States and Israel in opposition). 
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state by failing to condemn or declare as invalid the Palestinian 
declaration.56  
In addition to recognizing the Palestinian declaration, 
Professor Quigley argues that subsequent treatment of Palestinian 
representatives to the UN demonstrates that the UN recognizes a 
Palestinian state. 57   For example, the UN Security Council 
routinely allowed Palestine to participate in relevant sessions 
despite the fact that Council rules only allow a “state” to 
participate.58  
Lastly, Professor Quigley notes that following the 1988 
declaration, eighty-nine states recognized Palestine as a state, the 
vast majority of which were from the Third World.59  While the 
United States clearly refused to recognize a Palestinian state, 
European countries showed ambivalence. Although the vast 
majority of European states did not recognize a Palestinian state, 
some signaled that they viewed the question as far more nuanced 
than the United States viewed it.60  
Despite these arguments, the 1988 declaration and 
subsequent actions do not establish the existence of a Palestinian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Quigley, supra note 1 (arguing that the fact that 104 states voted for 
Palestinian statehood indicated that Palestine was regarded as a state); see also 
JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 161 (2010) (asserting that although Resolution 43/177 
did not admit Palestine as a member state, it affirmed Palestine’s statehood). 
57 See WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, ISRAEL’S RIGHTS AS A NATION-STATE IN 
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 118 (Alan Baker ed., 2011) (stating that the 
international perception of Palestine as a state is strong); see also ALAN DOWTY, 
ISRAEL/PALESTINE 215 (2012) (documenting that since 1988, over 130 nations 
have recognized Palestinian nationhood in one way or another). 
58 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 5 (showing that the U.N. Security Council let 
Palestine participate in sessions when relevant even though only states are 
eligible to participate); see also IS THERE A COURT FOR GAZA?: A TEST BENCH 
FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 451 (Chantal Meloni & Gianni Tognoni eds., 
2012) (admitting that Palestinian officials actively participate in the U.N.). 
59 See IS THERE A COURT FOR GAZA?: A TEST BENCH FOR INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 434 (showing that 89 states recognized Palestine 
shortly after the 1988 declaration); see also AMOS SHAPIRA & MALA TABORY, 
NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY 195 n. 48 (1990) (stating that 
many Third World and Eastern Bloc countries recognized Palestine). 
60 See G.A. RES. 43/177, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess. (showing a large list of 
countries who abstained on the question of Palestine’s nationhood in the General 
Assembly); see also Quigley, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting the French President as 
not ready to recognize a Palestinian state). 
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state. Applying a declaratory theory of state recognition, the 1988 
declaration failed because at the time of the declaration Palestine 
did not meet even a looser interpretation of Montevideo criterion.61  
At the time of the recognition, the PLO did not control any band of 
territory in the areas now known as the West Bank and Gaza.62  
Additionally the declaration failed under a purely constitutive 
understanding of statehood––a theory that proposes that 
recognition is sufficient to create a state––since the lack of 
European and American recognition prevents the 1988 declaration 
from creating a Palestinian state.63 
The 1988 declaration’s failure to create a Palestinian state 
is obvious given that Montevideo criterions were not met at the 
time of the declaration.64  That Palestine was not a state at the time 
of the 1988 declaration is obvious since “[a]pplying the 
Montevideo Convention in accordance with its terms, Palestine 
before 1993, could not possibly have constituted a State.”65  This is 
because “its whole territory was occupied by Israel, which 
functioned as a government there and claimed the right to do so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See JUSTUS REID WEINER & DIANE MORRISON, LINKING THE GAZA STRIP 
WITH THE WEST BANK: IMPLICATIONS OF A PALESTINIAN CORRIDOR ACROSS 
ISRAEL 14 (2007) (explaining that Palestine did not meet the Montevideo 
Convention criteria to be deemed a state); see also Joel Singer, Aspects of 
Foreign Relations Under the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza, in PALESTINE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 174, 176 (Sanford 
R. Silverburg ed., 2009) (showing that Palestine met none of the criteria for the 
Montevideo Convention). 
62 See SHAW, supra note 32 (stating that Palestine’s declaration at the conference 
in Algiers did not validate its statehood); see also Crawford, supra note 36, at 
309 (establishing that the PLO lacked substantial control over necessary 
territories). 
63 See SHAW, supra note 32 (emphasizing the constitutive theory of recognition); 
see also Crawford, supra note 36, at 309 (arguing that the United States and 
Israel’s absence of Palestinian recognition nullifies the constitutive argument). 
64 See Robert Weston Ash, Is Palestine A “State”? A Response To Professor 
John Quigley’s Article, “The Palestine Declaration to the International 
Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue,” 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 186, 193 (2009) 
(concluding that there is no State of Palestine); see also William Thomas, The 
Exercise of Jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court Over Palestine, 26 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1153, 1174 (2011) (stating that Palestine does not meet the 
criteria of the Montevideo Convention). 
65 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
437 (2d ed. 2006). 
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until further agreement.  The PLO had never functioned as a 
government there and lacked the means to do so.”66  
Attempts to compare Palestine to the statehood of the 
former Belgian Congo and Guinea-Bissau, which were recognized 
as states under a declaratory theory despite limited governmental 
control, are unconvincing.67  Unlike the situation in the former 
Belgian Congo, there was no breakdown in Israeli control in 1988, 
and unlike Guinea-Bissau, the PLO exercised no control over any 
territory.68  Also unconvincing is the argument that Palestine is 
similar to an occupied, existing state and that therefore, traditional 
criteria need not apply.69  A Palestinian state did not exist prior to 
Israeli occupation.  Absent a pre-existing state, occupation cannot 
vitiate the pre-existing requirement.70  Because it lacked one of the 
two elements of statehood, the PLO could not have established a 
state under international law.71 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Id.  
67 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing that the absence of effective 
government does not harm Palestinian claim to statehood). 
68 See Crawford, supra note 36, at 310 (1990) (finding that the National 
Liberation Organization’s extensive control over territories in Guinea-Bissau 
was a substantial factor in establishing Guinea-Bissau as its own state); see also 
Howard French, Mobutu Gives Up, Leaving Kinshasa and Ceding Power, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 17, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com /1997/ 05/17/world/mobutu-
gives-up-leaving-kinshasa-and-cedingpower.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
(stating that President Mobutu relinquished control of the Belgian Congo after 
32 years in power). 
69 See Quigley, supra note 1 at 6 (2009) (arguing that applying the traditional 
criteria to Palestine would be like arguing that Kuwait ceased to exist as a state 
when it was invaded); see also John Quigley, Palestine Statehood and 
International Law, GLOBAL POL’Y, Jan. 2013, at 4 (explaining that Palestine is 
denied statehood because it lacks factual control over its affairs and not due to 
Israeli occupation). 
70 See Shaw, supra note 31, at ¶22 (providing that the requirement of effective 
control was not negated where one State occupies part of the territory of another 
state). 
71 See D. RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 49 (2002) 
(enumerating the four traditional criteria required for statehood); see also David 
Davenport, Palestinian Statehood: Politics Trumps International Law – Again, 
FORBES MAGAZINE (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/david 
davenport/2012 /12/04/ palestinian-statehood-politics-trumps-international-law-
again/ (arguing that if Palestine does not meet the required criteria it is not a 
state despite being voted a nonmember observer state by the United Nations 
General Assembly). 
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Even if Quigley adopts a purely constitutive theory, 72 the 
PLO declaration and subsequent recognition failed to create a 
Palestinian state because recognition was insufficient under the 
constitutive theory. 73   Despite the fact that many developing 
countries recognized the Palestinian declaration, most European 
countries and the United States did not.74  In 1999, the European 
Union’s Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the European 
position on the 1988 declaration in a letter to Yasser Arafat.75  In 
that letter, the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to “the 
continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination 
including the option of a state” while expressing hope that peace 
would derive from a “negotiated solution.”76 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Crawford, supra note 63, at 438; see also Raphael Ahren, Is Palestine a 
State?: That May Depend on the Palestinians, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 12, 
2012), available at http://www.timesofisrael.com/is-palestine-a-state-that-may-
depend-on-the-palestinians/ (explaining that the constitutive theory suggests that 
international law recognizes an entity as a state if it is recognized by other 
states). 
73 See Crawford,, supra note 63, at 438 (discussing that before 1993, Palestine 
was recognized as a State by approximately one hundred States, but has never 
garnered the support required to establish a rule of international law to create 
Palestinian statehood); see also Kathryn M. Mckinney, The Legal Effects of the 
Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine, 
18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 93, 97 (1994) (noting that a declaratory or constructive 
theory is insufficient to establish statehood for Palestine). 
74 See l Beoliel & Perry, supra note 43, at 82–83 (noting that while most 
countries within the Arab League and Soviet bloc, as well as several non-
identifying states recognized Palestine’s declaration of statehood, the United 
States and European Union refused to recognize Palestine as a state); see also 
U.S. Informs U.N. It Will Close PLO Mission, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1988, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-03-11/news/mn-1412_1_ united-states 
(discussing that the United States, still not recognizing Palestine as a state, 
sought to shut down the PLO mission at the U.N. after it unilaterally declared 
statehood in 1988). 
75 See Berlin European Council, Presidency Conclusions, at E.U. Doc. D/99/1 at 
24 (Mar. 25, 1999) (discussing the European Union’s position regarding the 
future of Palestine’s statehood); see also John Quigley, Palestine: The Issue of 
Statehood, in PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS 37, 42 (Sanford R. Silverburg ed., 2002) (noting that even though 
some states recognized Palestine’s declaration of statehood, most European 
states declined to do so at that time). 
76 See Beoliel & Perry, supra note 43, at 82–83 (discussing that in 1999, just 
before Israeli-Palestinian negotiations began, the European Union’s Minister of 
Foreign affairs sent a letter to Chairman Arafat discussing Palestine’s 
unqualified right to self-determination); see also Berlin European Council, 
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The United Nation’s treatment of Palestine is likewise 
conflicting.  Palestine is not recognized as a member state or as a 
non-member state; rather, it has permanent observer status. 77  
Many regional and international organizations enjoy observer 
status at the United Nations, so this status does not indicate UN 
recognition of statehood.78  Further, the UN General Assembly’s 
declaration changing the PLO’s designation from “Palestinian 
Liberation Organization” to Palestine was made “without prejudice 
to the observer status and function of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization within the United Nations system.”79  
Still, from 1989-1992 the Security Council allowed only 
two non-state parties to address the Security Council without 
reference to Rules 39 or 37.80  While Professor Quigley overstates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Presidency Conclusions, at 24, E.U. Doc. D/99/1 (Mar. 25, 1999) (reaffirming 
the call of the Minister’s letter in support of negotiation). 
77 See G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3237 (1974) (inviting the PLO to 
participate in General Assembly sessions as an observer); see also DeBernardi, 
supra note 9, at 88–89 (explaining that Palestine has retained observer status 
within the United Nations since 1974). 
78 See M. A. Thomas, When the Guests Move in: Permanent Observers to the 
United Nations Gain the Right to Establish Permanent Missions in the United 
States, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 197, 224 (1990) (discussing that those members with 
“observer” status in the United Nations are not officially recognized states, and 
as such are not entitled to diplomatic privileges or immunities); see also 
Permanent Observers, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/about 
permobservers.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (explaining the role of a 
permanent observer within the United Nations, expanding upon the role of non-
member states and organizations that are not recognized states).  
79 See Shaw, supra note 31, at 8–9 (emphasizing that the United Nations has 
merely changed Palestine’s observer title without any effect on their statehood 
claim); see also Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Votes 
Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in 
United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012) (noting the 
United Nation’s continued recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer 
rather than a member). 
80 See  U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL: PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF SECURITY 
COUNCIL 1989-1992, 58 (2007), available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ 
repertoire/89-92/89-92_c.pdf (noting that an invitation was extended to Palestine 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who are neither UN members nor 
Secretariat members); see also Friedrich Soltau, The Right to Participate in the 
Debates of the Security Council, ASIL, Oct. 2000, http://www.asil.org/ 
insigh52.cfm (discussing the Security Council’s ability to invite non-member 
participants to their sessions without express authorization under rule 37 and 
39). 
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the degree to which the UN treats Palestine as a state,81 it is fair to 
characterize UN treatment of Palestinian statehood as more 
complicated than simple non-recognition as argued by Professor 
Shaw.82  Still, ambivalent treatment by the United Nations does not 
create a state.83  
Even though the 1988 declaration is an assertion of 
statehood on the part of the Palestinians, it fails to demonstrate 
Palestinian statehood for three reasons.  First, Palestine did not 
meet the traditional statehood requirements.  Second, while there 
was wide international support, many of the key parties including 
the United States, Israel, and most European countries did not 
recognize Palestine’s declaration.  Lastly, while the UN General 
Assembly has accorded Palestine unique treatment, it has not 
explicitly recognized Palestinian to be a state.   
 
3. The Limits of a “Course of Dealing” Argument for 
Statehood 
 
Some scholars have argued that European and Israeli 
interactions with Palestinian leadership indicate recognition of a 
Palestinian state.84  Recognition, they argue, need not be formal.85 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Votes 
Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in 
United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012) (quoting 
Turkey’s Foreign Affairs Minister as he acknowledges that Palestine 
unfortunately still holds an observer status); see also Beoliel & Perry, supra note 
43, at 84–85 (2010) (describing the UN General Assembly’s satisfaction with 
the progress of negotiations and adherence to the Oslo framework towards the 
working creation of the Palestinian state). 
82 See UNITED NATIONS, THE QUESTION OF THE PALESTINE AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 24 (2008) (noting the United Nations continuous efforts in expanding 
Palestine’s role within the General Assembly sessions); see also Shaw, supra 
note 31 at 8–9 (noting that the United Nations’ has not recognized Palestinian 
statehood although it has granted them a special observer status). 
83 See Ash, supra note 49, at 194–95 (claiming Palestinian statehood is a fiction 
evidenced by their classification as an “entity” permitted to participate in 
sessions); see also Worster, supra note 20, at 1173 (noting the UN General 
Assembly’s refusal to explicitly acknowledge Palestine as a state despite 
granting them observer status).  
84 See John Quigley, Palestine is a State: A Horse with Black and White Stripes 
is a Zebra, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 749, 758–59 (2011) (arguing Israeli recognition 
of Palestinian statehood when Israel agreed to negotiate borders with Palestinian 
leaders); see also Worster, supra note 20, at 1169-1171 (noting European 
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Instead, recognition can be demonstrated through the “attitude” of 
other states.86  “If states treat an entity as a state, then they are 
considered to recognize it” even if “those states did not recognize 
Palestine in a formal way.”87  The international community, the 
argument goes, clearly recognizes a Palestinian state because it 
encourages Israel to negotiate over territory and recognize a 
Palestinian right to statehood. 
 This argument is wrong for two reasons.  First, even if 
states can be considered to have recognized one another despite 
formally withholding recognition, American and Israeli 
recognition of Palestine does not follow.  These states have not 
merely refrained from formally recognizing Palestine, but have 
also specifically announced that they do not consider Palestine to 
be an independent state.88  As noted, the United States and Israel 
voted against the UN General Assembly’s change in reference to 
the PLO and the United States has repeatedly disapproved of all of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recognition of Palestinian statehood followed by the European Union’s 
participation in international treaties with Palestine). 
85 See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 7, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19 (proclaiming that “[t]he recognition of a state may be express or 
tacit”); see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 167 (July 9) 
(detailing agreements that have taken place between Israel and Palestine even 
though Palestine’s statehood was not formally recognized).  
86 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 7 (highlighting how the efforts of the United 
States and USSR to initiate dialogue between Palestine and Israel reflect a 
recognition of Palestine as a state); see also Paul Lewis, Arabs at U.N. Relax 
Stand on P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1989, at A3 (articulating that although 
there was opposition, 89 of the UN’s 159 members recognized the Palestine 
Liberation Organization as a representation of the Palestine State). 
87 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that the UN’s 1989 drafted resolution 
was supported by a previous resolve in which the Palestine Liberation 
Organization was accepted as an observer of the United Nations and dealt with 
as a state); see also Quigley, supra note 1, at 260 (emphasizing Palestine’s 
invitation to a 1998 meeting for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court when only states and state organizations were invited). 
88  See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Votes 
Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in 
United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012) (listing Israel 
and the United States as among the nine members voting against “non-member 
observer state” status for Palestine); see also MacAskill &  McGreal, supra note 
23, at 32 (expressing Israel’s belief that the Palestinian statehood can only be 
achieved through direct negotiations, and not the proposed resolution). 
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Palestine’s unilateral declarations of statehood.89  Likewise, the 
European Union announced its “readiness, when appropriate, to 
recognize a Palestinian state,”90 suggesting that it has not gone so 
far as to formally recognize a Palestinian state thus far.  Palestine 
should be considered a National Liberation Movement, which has 
international personality but not statehood.91  
Second, as discussed above in Part I.A.1, prior to the 
United Nations General Assembly vote, it was not clear whether 
Palestine considered itself a state.  If Palestine did not consider 
itself a state, then no interactions could make it a state.92   
The arguments for Palestinian statehood are ultimately 
unconvincing. Palestine did not meet the traditional criteria for 
statehood at the time of its 1988 declaration.93  The United States, 
Israel, and most European countries explicitly announced that they 
do not recognize a Palestinian state despite their negotiations with 
the Palestinian Authority.94  Finally, even the Palestinians do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See Obama Says Palestinians Are Using Wrong Forum, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/09/22/world/obama-united-
nations-speech.html?_r=0. 
90 See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusion on the Middle East 
Peace Process, 3058th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels (Dec. 13, 
2010) (stating that the European Union lauds Palestine’s efforts in creating the 
framework for its future recognition as a State); see also Shaw, supra note 46 at 
309–10 (asserting that the European Union will likely support Palestine in its 
quest for statehood once it demonstrates clear and formal action).  
91 See SHAW, supra note 32, at 245 (examining whether National Liberation 
Movements are recognized within the context of international law); see also 
Arab Parliaments, National Liberation Movement "Fateh", U.N. DEV. PROGRAM 
(Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://www.arabparliaments.org/whatwedo/parties.aspx?cid=14&pid=186 
(discussing the political agenda of National Liberation Movement also known as 
Fateh). 
92 See Worster, supra note 20, at 1160–65  (noting that the Palestinian National 
Authority consciously chose not take a definitive position on the status of 
Palestinian statehood); see also Alain Pellet, The Palestinian Declaration and 
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 8 (4), 
981 (2010) (declaring that the Court cannot declare Palestine a state). 
93 See Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status 
of Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 27, 81–89 
(1997) (explaining the requirements for statehood under the Montevideo 
Convention Criteria); but see Quigley, supra note 82, at 760–61 (arguing that 
the negations between Palestine and Israel over boarders infers that Israel 
recognizes Palestine as a state). 
94 See Ariosto & Pearson, supra note 24 (quoting Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador 
to the U.N., in stating that the upgraded U.N. status for Palestine Authority did 
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consider themselves a state.95  Arguments for Palestinian statehood 
should not persuade the ICC to break with the clear consensus of 
international scholars and find that Palestine is a state.  
 
B. Rome Statute’s Definition of Statehood 
  
If Palestine is not a state under traditional criteria, the ICC 
can only assert jurisdiction if the Rome Statute’s use of the term 
“state” can be interpreted contrary to its traditional meaning. The 
Rome Statute does not define the term “state.”  Other international 
courts have interpreted the word “state” in the context of the object 
and purpose of the treaty.96  In dispute is whether those court 
opinions interpreting “state” in the context of the object and 
purpose of the treaty are relevant to interpreting the ICC and 
whether the ordinary meaning of the word controls the definition 
of “state” as used by the Rome Statute. 
Part B.1 argues that the word “state” in the Rome Statute 
should be interpreted in accordance with its general definition in 
international law.  This section rejects the argument that the ICC 
should adopt a functional definition of “state” in place of the 
general definition of “state” under international law. Part B.2 
applies the functional approach and argues that this approach does 
not support the recognition of Palestine as a state, and therefore 
that the ICC does not exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not establish Palestine as a state); but see U.N. Grants Palestine Status of 
Nonmember Observer State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/ 
p/Palestinian_authority/index.html (reporting that on Nov. 29, 2012, the U.N., 
against the vote of the United States, granted Palestine recognition as a 
nonmember observer state). 
95 See Interview by Guy Raz with Ehud Olmert, former Israeli Prime Minister 
(Dec. 1, 2012) (arguing the Palestinians’ proposal for statehood shows that they 
do not recognize themselves as a state); see also Alan Dershowitz, Why the U.N. 
Should Not Recognize the Proposed Palestinian State, HUFFINGTON POST, Sep. 
21, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/the-
united-nations-should_b_973792.html (acknowledging that the proposal to 
recognize Palestine as a state indicates that they do not even recognize 
themselves as a state). 
96 Compare MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 309–10 (6th ed. 2008) 
with Pellet, supra note 90, at 985–89; see also Situation in Palestine, INT’L 
CRIM. CT. (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/ 
SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf (finding that the General Assembly may 
rely on the Rome Statute to define state). 
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in Palestine.  Part B.3 argues that even if a proper application of 
the functional approach results in a definition of “state” that is 
distinct from the term’s ordinary meaning, the ICC does not have 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Palestine. 
 
1. The Ordinary Meaning is the Correct Meaning 
 
Absent any express indication that the term “state” has a 
special meaning, the term must be interpreted to conform to its 
definition under general international law.  This result is mandated 
by Article 31(1),97 and 31(4),98 of the Vienna Convention, which 
govern the interpretation of international treaties, including the 
Rome Statute.99  When other treaties sought to define “state” more 
broadly than its ordinary meaning, those constitutive documents 
explicitly defined the term “state” to include entities that did not 
meet the traditional definition of “state.” 100   Resort to the 
functional approach is only appropriate where the meaning of term 
to be interpreted is ambiguous.101  Since the use of “state” in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Vienna Convention art. 31(1), 23 U.S.T. 3227 (“[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”); see also Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 458 (stating that 
the Vienna Convention allows states’ rights to be construed liberally by courts). 
98 See Art. 31(4) Vienna Convention, 23 U.S.T. 3227, (“[a] special meaning shall 
be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”). 
99 Compare MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 310–11 (6th ed. 2008) 
with Michael Kourabas, A Vienna Convention Interpretation of the "Interests of 
Justice" Provision of the Rome Statute, the Legality of Domestic Amnesty 
Agreements, and the Situation in Northern Uganda: A "Great Qualitative Step 
Forward," or a Normative Retreat?, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 59, 69 
(2007) (recognizing that the Rome Statute’s interpretation is guided by the 
Vienna Convention). 
100 See Yuval Shany, In Defence Of Functional Interpretation of Article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute: A Response to Yael Ronen, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 329, 335 
(2010) (broadening the definition of the term “state” to allow “quasi-state” 
participation in proceedings normally reserved for states); see also Trademark 
Law Treaty art. 1, Oct. 27, 1994, 112 Stat. 3064, 2037 U.N.T.S. 35 (displaying 
how States are often held separate from other entities under the Law of 
Treaties). 
101 See Dana L. Christensen, The Elusive Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Air 
Transportation Between the United States and South Korea, 10 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 653, 667–68 (2001) (declaring that Article 31 of the VCLT deliberately 
put the textual approach to interpretation ahead of the functionalist view); see 
also Criddle, supra note 95, at 440 (noting that the functional approach is also 
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Rome Statute is unambiguous there is no need to employ a 
functional approach that defines state more broadly by searching 
for the object and purpose of the treaty.102 
Courts employing a functional approach in defining “state” 
more broadly often do so where the treaty itself suggests a broader 
definition.  Thus, while there are examples of courts adopting a 
functional approach,103 these decisions do not indicate that “[t]he 
functional view of the state and its subdivisions [are] 
omnipresent.”104  Rather, it appears the more common approach is 
to define state in accordance with its general meaning unless a 
treaty specifically indicates an intention to define “state” more 
broadly, or the term is ambiguous and an alternative definition is 
necessary to allow the statute to fulfill its stated purpose.105 
The ordinary meaning should be employed unless the treaty 
itself explicitly defines the term “state” to include entities not 
considered a state under general international law.  When the 
ordinary meaning of “state” is not intended, the treaty will 
explicitly define the term “state.”106  For example, the Convention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
appropriate where ordinary interpretation of terms would result in an absurd or 
unreasonable outcome). 
102 See Anthony Clark Arend, Who’s Afraid of the Geneva Conventions? Treaty 
Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 709, 
723–24 (2007) (arguing that Article 31 of the VCLT only endorses use of other 
sources to find a treaty’s object and purpose when they provide material that is 
authoritative of interpretation); see also ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI & 
SARAH WILLIAMS, 40 YEARS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 197 (2010) (theorizing that the functionalist approach is not a feasible 
means of interpretation).  
103 See Pellet, supra note 90, at 986 (noting Advocate General Geoffrey Jacobs 
believed the ECJ correctly followed a functional approach when deciding the 
outcome of the Stardust Marine case); see also Shany, supra note 98, at 335 
(examining the use of the functional approach to allow the participation of 
“quasi-states” Palestine and Kosovo in advisory proceedings). 
104 IS THERE A COURT FOR GAZA?: A TEST BENCH FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 56, at 413. 
105 See Alfred P. Rubin, The Theology of Arms Control - and US Politics, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 2, 1987, http://www.csmonitor.com 
/1987/0602/eabm.html (illustrating the dangers of interpreting a treaty’s terms in 
discord with their traditional meaning); see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille 
Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (refusing to broaden the Federal 
interpretation of “state” from the traditional definition).  
106 See Ola Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An 
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 327 (2008) (concluding that the use 
of ordinary meaning of words is in accordance with the rules of the Vienna 
Convention); see also Worster, supra note 20, at 1188 (stating that according to 
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on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on 
International liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects 
defined the term “state” broadly.107  In doing so, it authorizes 
courts to define “state” in a manner that differs from its traditional 
meaning.108  The fact that the Rome Statute’s use of “state” should 
be given its ordinary meaning is especially convincing in light of 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.  Rule 2(iii) of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence defines “state” to include “a self-proclaimed entity 
de facto exercising governmental functions, whether recogni[z]ed 
as a State or not.”109  The parties to the ICC, however, did not 
include any explicit language indicating that the term “state” 
should carry a meaning other than its ordinary meaning. 
Supporters of employing a functional approach rather than 
the ordinary meaning point to two cases where they believe a 
functional approach was employed to define “state” beyond its 
ordinary meaning, even where the treaty did not explicitly support 
a broader definition.  One example is the supposed endorsement by 
The European Court of Human Rights of a functional approach,110 
in the Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain case.111  Alain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the rules of the Vienna Convention, a term’s ordinary meaning controls in light 
of a treaty’s overall purpose). 
107 See Pellet, supra note 90, at 985–86 (citing the broad definitions of the term 
“state” given by various conventions, including the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and the 1972 Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects). 
108 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 201 (1987) (defining 
statehood as consisting of a permanent population with the capacity to formally 
engage with foreign entities); see also Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: 
The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
403, 409–10 (1999) (citing to various narrow definitions of statehood, including 
one that defines statehood as an association of a considerable number of men 
living within a definite territory). 
109 United Nations Extraordinary Plenary Session, International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991: Rules and Procedures, IT/32/Rev.43 (July 24, 2009). 
110 See Pellet, supra note 90, at 986–87 (noting that the European Court of 
Human Rights acknowledged that the Principality of Andorra could have 
claimed jurisdiction over the defendants if it had consented to the Convention).  
111 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 2, 4, 6 
(1992) (writing that Mr. Jordi Drozf and Mr. Pavel Janousek, citizens of Spain 
the Czechoslovakia respectively, were convicted by a court of the Principality of 
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Pellet suggests that the ECHR opinion demonstrates that the court 
has no doubts about its ability to extend its jurisdiction over non-
state entities such as Andorra even though the treaty only explicitly 
covers state entities.112  This suggestion is flatly contradicted by 
language of the court: 
 
[T]he Principality is not one of the members of the 
Council of Europe, and this prevents it being a party 
to the Convention in its own right. . . . It could no 
doubt have sought to be admitted as an "associate 
member" of the organi[z]ation under Article 5 of 
the Statute; if its application had been accepted by 
the Committee of Ministers, it would have had the 
right, as Saarland had in 1950, to sign and ratify the 
Convention. But it appears never to have taken any 
steps to do this.113 
 
The court’s language does not indicate an endorsement of a 
functional approach that expands the definition of “state.”  Instead, 
the court reasoned that if the Principality was admitted under 
Article 5, which allows “associate membership” to non-sovereign 
countries, including non-state entities, then Andorra could, 
consistent with precedent, sign on to the Convention.114  This is 
hardly a bold endorsement of the functional approach to 
interpreting the meaning of “state.”  Instead, the court held that had 
Andorra joined the Council of Europe as a non-state member in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Andorra of armed robbery in response to which they argued that during their 
trial they were deprived of certain rights). 
112 See Statute of the Council of Europe art. 5, Aug. 3, 1949, E.T.S. 001 
(describing the associate member admission process to the Council of Europe); 
see also Pellet, supra note 90, at 986–87 (describing the functional view of the 
state as applied in ECJ case law and the Drozd and Janousek case). 
113 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 22–23 
(1992). 
114 See Statute of the Council of Europe art. 5, Aug. 3, 1949, E.T.S. 001 
(highlighting the role that Article 5 played in the court’s reasoning on the 
Andorra question); see also Thomas Giegerich, The Palestinian Autonomy and 
International Human Rights Law: Perspectives on an ongoing Process of 
Nation-Building, in NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY 
183, 189–91 (Amos Shapira & Mala Tabory eds., 1999) (describing 
characteristics of Israeli and Palestinian governance that suggest statehood in the 
international legal arena). 
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accordance with Article 5 then it could also join the Convention.115  
This holding did not expand the meaning of state in any way. 
A second argument that the ICC can abandon the ordinary 
meaning, despite the absence of any clear indication that a 
different meaning was intended, rests on the International Court of 
Justice’s (“ICJ”) opinion in the Reparations Case.116  However, 
this case did not support the use of the functional approach in this 
instance.117 In the Reparations Case the ICJ cited Articles 104 and 
2(5) of the UN Charter in deciding that the United Nations had 
objective international legal personality even though the charter 
did not explicitly provide the UN with objective international legal 
personality.118  This decision cannot support the proposition that a 
functional approach is appropriate in all circumstances.119  
In fact, the ICJ opinion is easily distinguishable from the 
task of interpreting the Rome Statute that confronts the ICC.  In the 
Reparations Case the ICJ noted that the very concept of 
international legal personality is inherently flexible. 120   Pellet 
acknowledges that this definitional ambiguity is central to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 22–23 
(1992) (reasoning that Andorra, as a non-state member of the Council of Europe 
in a similar position to Saarland in 1950, possessed capability to join the other 
European agreements). 
116 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) (describing the mode of 
interpretation the ICJ is using to attribute international personality to 
international organizations). 
117 Id. (outlining the functions of the United Nations and the attendant affects of 
functions on the international legal personality analysis). 
118  Id. at 178–79 (Apr. 11) (determining that the Charter’s intended 
characteristics of the United Nations were exercise and enjoy, functions and 
rights that can only be explained by its objective international legal personality); 
see also Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International 
Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 53, 67–69 (1995) (discussing how the United Nations, as an 
organization, established its objective legal personality). 
119 See SHAW, supra note 32, at 1307 (discussing the narrowness of this 
approach and how any attempt at inferring a power would fail if it was 
inconsistent with an express power); see also F.A. Mann, International 
Corporations and National Law, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145, 158 (1967) 
(explaining that the Reparations Case was unique and cannot be generalized). 
120 See Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 IUS GENTIUM 35, 47 
(2005) (discussing the ambivalence of objective UN legal personality and its 
flexibility while highlighting the needs of the community in determining legal 
nature). 
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argument for the functional approach.121  Despite some ambiguities 
around the edges, it is clear that any decision on statehood must be 
made with reference to either the Montevideo Convention and 
international recognition or independence.122  The definition of 
state that would allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction does not fall 
within the traditional meaning of state, however ambiguities in that 
definition are resolved.123 
Further the ICJ decision rested on the proposition that for 
the UN “to achieve [its specified] ends and the attribution of 
international personality is indispensable.” 124  Under the Rome 
Statute the ICC has an avenue for exercising jurisdiction over 
alleged Israeli crimes, even under a more narrow definition of 
state.  It allows the Security Council to refer crimes committed by 
non-member states to the ICC.125  Frustration with the temporary 
political reality should not persuade the ICC to adopt a more 
expansive but less convincing approach to interpreting the Rome 
Statute. Therefore, the Reparations Case provides no support for a 
functional approach that re-interprets an unambiguously defined 
term that fulfills the statute’s objective as defined. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121  See Pellet, supra note 90, at  988 (discussing the difficulties of keeping to a 
clear, and ordinary meaning for the concept of the state due to its “variable 
geometry”); see also Shany, supra note 98, at 336 (advocating for a functional 
approach to help offer quasi-states with international legal personality, such as 
the Palestinian National Authority, the opportunity to participate in ICC’s 
delegated jurisdictions, on a case-by-case basis).  
122 See SHAW, supra note 32, at 445–48 (examining two different theories 
relevant to recognition of states); see also Grant, supra note 106, at 413–14 
(reiterating the four criteria for determining statehood as promulgated by the 
Montevideo Convention: state must possess a permanent population, defined 
territory, effective government over the extent of its territory, and capacity to 
engage in international relations). 
123 See Pellet, supra note 90, at 983 (arguing that a position on Palestinian 
statehood need not be reached since, even if it isn’t a state under the traditional 
definition it is under the definition of state he proposes using the functional 
approach); but see Ronen, supra note 50, at 11–16 (analyzing whether there is a 
legitimate Palestinian state, concluding there is not since there has never been a 
Palestinian claim of statehood).  
124 See Shaw, supra note 46, at 313 (citing Reparation for Injuries Suffered in 
the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11)). 
125 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, SC/8351  (Mar. 
31, 2005), http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351 (showing that 
through a narrow definition of state the ICC exercised jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in Sudan). 
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2. Proper Use of Functional Approach 
 
 Even if a functional approach is employed, recognizing that 
Article 12 was the result of a carefully constructed jurisdictional 
balance militates against a definition of state that diverges from its 
ordinary meaning.  Applied properly, the functional approach 
recognizes that the jurisdictional provisions of the Rome Statute, 
including article 12, were carefully negotiated to balance 
competing objects and purposes.126  ICC President Philippe Kirsch 
explained the compromise that resulted in the current version of 
12(3) “[a]s a compromise between these widely divergent 
positions, the Statute allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction with 
the acceptance of either the territorial State or the State of 
nationality of the accused.”127  This careful balance, which is part 
of the object and purpose of the treaty, would be destroyed by a 
definition of state that extends to non-state entities.128  Properly 
stated then, the object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to 
“promote the fight against impunity within the jurisdictional 
framework of the statute.”129  
 The object and purpose of the treaty to fight against 
impunity is not frustrated by the more narrow interpretation of 
state.  Article 12 still provides the Security Council an opportunity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126  See OTTO TRIFFTERER, COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 11 (2d ed. 2008) (showing that President 
Kirsch stated that the provision will  be regarded by some as too restrictive, and 
by others as too permisive;  see also IS THERE A COURT FOR GAZA?: A TEST 
BENCH FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 503 (arguing that the 
functional approach should be applied on a case-by-case basis). 
127 Interview by Citizens for Global Solutions with Philippe Kirsch, ICC 
President (Feb. 12-13, 2009), available at http://archive2.globalsolutions. 
org/node/1175 (demonstrating Philippe Kirsch’s belief that enforcement by the 
ICC will require further cooperation from independent states). 
128  See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (showing the signatories to the Rome Treaty 
are all states); see also Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Situation in Palestine (2012), available at http://icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/ 
SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf (declining to recognize Palestine as a state 
for the purposes of the Rome Statute). 
129 See SHAW, supra note 32, at 314; see also Kourabas, supra note 97, at 71–73 
(restating the object and purpose of the Rome Statute and listing way in which 
states cannot be deprived from the object and purpose). 
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to refer any crimes to the ICC.130  The fact that the United States 
very likely would exercise its veto power is of no concern.  The 
drafters of the ICC knew the possibility of political decision-
making and agreed to tolerate it.131  Further, Israel could accept the 
jurisdiction of the ICC either through acceding to the treaty or by 
filing its own 12(3) declaration.132  In addition, there are many 
legal avenues that exist even if the ICC cannot exercise 
jurisdiction.133  
 The good faith and practice requirement further militate in 
favor of a functional approach that adopts the ordinary meaning. 
Practice under the Rome Statute since establishment of the ICC 
indicates that the parties understand state to have its ordinary 
meaning.134  Indeed, M. Cherif Bassiouni unambiguously stated, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130  See Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International 
Criminal Court: A Paradox of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” 9 ANN. SURV. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 31 (2003) (stating that, if the Security Council does not 
refer a case, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to acts that occur within territories 
of a member state); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The United States and the 
International Criminal Court: Achieving a Wider Consensus Through the 
“Ithaca Package,” 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 535, 540 (1999) (illustrating that the 
ICC has jurisdiction in any case referred to it by the Security Council). 
131 See Michael A. Newton, Harmony or Hegemony? The American Military 
Role in the Pursuit of Justice, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 231, 250 (2004) (recognizing 
how the drafters of the Rome statute knew the ICC would have limited resources 
and political capital and, therefore, its jurisdiction was limited to more severe 
and difficult prosecutions); see also Michael P. Scharf & Patrick Dowd, No Way 
Out? The Question of Unilateral Withdrawals of Referrals to the ICC and Other 
Human Rights Courts, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 582 (2009) (discussing the 
procedual safeguards created to protect the ICC from only receiving frivolous or 
politically motivated referrals).  
132 See Beoliel & Perry, supra note 43, at 75 (explaining how opinions began to 
change after Palestine filed its Article 12(3) declaration even though it was not a 
signatory to the statute); see also Goran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals 
to the International Criminal Court, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 
610 (2003) (stating that Article 12(3) of the ICC statute provides an option for 
non-member states to unconditionally accept the ICC’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc 
basis).    
133 See Noah Weisboard, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 203 
(2008) (providing three uncommonly used alternatives in which the ICC may 
exercise jurisdiction when the Security Council does not make an explicit 
referral). For a discussion of different avenues that the ICC may use to exercise 
its jurisdiction, see generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 411–14 
(6th ed. 2008). 
134 See SHAW, supra note 32, at 411–12 (specifying how the ICC’s territorial 
jurisdiction may only be exercised over crimes committed within states who 
have become parties to the statute); see also Worster, supra note 20, at 1192 
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“[a]s Chairman of the Diplomatic Conference’s Drafting 
Committee, I can attest to the fact the referrals under Article 12(3) 
were intended to be by states only.”135  This statement is further 
supported by the status accorded Palestine at the Rome 
Conference.  There, Palestine was not listed as a “participating 
state,” but instead listed under “other organizations.”136  A good 
faith interpretation of the object and purpose of the treaty should 
take into account such a clear statement of the context in which the 
object and purpose of the treaty should be understood.137 
Properly understood the full object and purpose of the 
Rome Statute suggests that the ICC should employ the ordinary 
meaning of “state.”  This ordinary meaning of state does not leave 
Israel free to act; indeed under the current framework the Security 
Council could refer Israel to the ICC.  While it is true that the 
current political and legal climate the ICC cannot exercise 
jurisdiction, at a future time Israel very well may be subject to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(suggesting that the term “state” should be interpreted liberally to provide a 
forum for each party to voice concerns). 
135  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Comment on the Gaza Question: “Does the 
Prosecutor of the ICC Have the Authority To Open an Investigation into Alleged 
Crimes Committed in the 2008–2009 Gaza Conflict?,” HUMAN RIGHTS & INT’L 
CRIM. LAW ONLINE FORUM, http://uclalawforum.com/forum/permalink/859 (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2013) (discussing that Palestine may not be considered a state 
for purposes of Article 12(3) of the ICC statute if it has not declared itself a 
state); see also Solon Solomon, Occupied or Not: The Question of Gaza’s Legal 
Status After the Israeli Disengagement, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 81 
n.91 (2011) (demonstrating how the issue over whether Palestine is a state 
“erupted” when it filed a declaration under Article 12(3) with the ICC).     
136  See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 
Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee 
of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. 2), at 44 (1998), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.
pdf (listing Palestine under “other organizations” as opposed to “participating 
states). 
137 Mr. Bassiouni, in his post on the UCLA forum, concluded that “Article 12(3) 
does not apply.” Bassiouni, supra note 133. However, he also stated that he 
signed onto Pellet’s submission to the ICC arguing that a functional approach 
allows the ICC to accept jurisdiction pursuant to 12(3). Id. It is unclear why he 
signed a submission that contradicts the position he publicly took in his UCLA 
post. Id. Also confusing, is his claim that “there is no doubt that all of the 
elements of statehood exist for Palestine to declare itself a state. And, indeed it 
did so in 1988.” Id.  According to Bassiouni, if not for Palestinian withdrawal of 
this declaration during Oslo, Palestine would clearly be a state. Id. This position 
was roundly criticized by James Crawford. See Crawford, supra note 36, at 309.  
                           ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF              [Vol. 3, No. 2            
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
	  
196 
ICC jurisdiction.  The temporary reality does not “mean that the 
rules on jurisdiction are inadequate, but merely demonstrates that 
the ICC is not omnipotent.138  
Thus the proper application of the functional approach 
mandates concluding that the object and purpose of the treaty, 
taken together with subsequent practice, makes clear that “state” 
does not include non-state entities.  Surely the purpose of the 
Rome Statute is to help “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators 
of [grave] crimes” by creating “an independent permanent 
International Criminal Court.”139  It does not follow, however, that 
the Statute’s purpose demands an interpretation of “state” in a 
manner contrary to its ordinary meaning.   
Perhaps recognizing these arguments, many of those who 
argue for a functional approach argue that, even if the larger 
Statute does not bear the more expansive definition of state, 12(3) 
does.140   Article 12(3), they claim, must be interpreted broadly 
because the purpose of the ICC is “to protect the basic interests of 
the international community as a whole.”141  If state is interpreted 
to exclude Palestine, then the Rome Statute “will remain 
irreversibly (except if the Security Council takes action) 142 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Israel & International Treaty Adherence, RULE OF LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS PROJECT, http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/international 
_treaties.php?id_state=113 (explaining that while Israel signed the Rome 
Statute, they are not a party to the treaty); see also Israel and the International 
Criminal Court, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2002), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/Israel%20and%2
0the%20International%20Criminal%20Court (last visited January 29, 2013) 
(depicting Israel’s tenuous relationship with the ICC and it’s reluctance to ratify 
the Treaty of Rome). 
139 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid 
/3ae6b3a84.html (outlining the objective of the Rome Statute); see also 
Implementation of the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/ ?mod=romeimplementation (stating 
that the main purpose of the Rome Statute is to close the gap on the most 
heinous of international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity). 
140 See, e.g., Pellet, supra note 90 (arguing that even if the Statute as a whole 
uses a more limited definition of “state, 12(c) by itself uses an expansive 
definition); see also Shany, supra note 98 (explaining the expansive definition 
of “state” in section 12(c) of the Rome Statute). 
141 IS THERE A COURT FOR GAZA? A TEST BENCH FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 56, at 423. 
142 As I will discuss further below this claim is wrong. However, it is worth 
noting that Pellet recognizes that the Rome Statute provides a means of 
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ineffective in the Palestinian occupied territories.”143  Thus, even 
though the ordinary meaning of 12(3),144 “militates in favour of a 
traditional understanding of the term” a broader reading is required 
since that reading “would contribute to the fulfillment of the 
Court’s mandate to end impunity.”145 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention makes clear that the 
proper application of the functional approach must interpret the 
term “state” in its context and in good faith in accordance with the 
object and purpose of the Rome Statute taking into account 
subsequent agreements or practices in applying the treaty.146  A 
proper functional approach asks how to interpret “state” given the 
Statute’s purpose of fighting against impunity, but recognizing that 
the use of the object and purpose is “circumscribed by the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed in Palestine and then proceeds to 
claim that Israel could act with impunity. See Pellet, supra note 90, at 995 
(stating that the Rome Statute reflects the intention not to permit a State to 
unilaterally block the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC). 
143 See Pellet, supra note 90, at 996 (suggesting that such a result would be 
intolerable because the very purpose of the Rome statute is to protect the 
interests of the international community as a whole). This conclusion is in part 
the result of Pellet’s erroneous claim that “only the Palestinian authority 
possesses, under international law, an exclusive territorial title over the 
Palestinian territory and the population established therein.” Id. As Shaw points 
out, “[t]itle to territory is held by states.” See Shaw, supra note 31 (arguing that 
sovereign title was always recognized as being held by the administering State). 
If Pellet’s arguments truly proceed on the assumption that Palestine is not a state 
then this claim is “replete with hazard for the international community, as well 
as being legally dubious.” This is especially so in the case of Palestine where the 
Oslo Accords make clear that “the question of territorial title to the Palestinian 
territories is a matter that can only be resolved by agreement [between] the 
relevant parties, including Israel.” Id. at  ¶ 46 (asserting that these matters should 
be resolved in peace process negotiations).  
144 Article 12(3) reads: “If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to the 
Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with 
the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the 
crime.” See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (listing preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction). 
145 See Shany, supra note 98, at 336 (explaining how the object and purpose of 
the Rome Statute is well-served by a functional approach). 
146 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (establishing the general rule of treaty 
interpretation); see also David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and 
Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
565, 578 (2010) (stating that treaty interpretation must rely primarily on the 
terms of a treaty while context and the treaty’s object and purpose must inform 
its meaning).   
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required elements of article 31(1). 147   It cannot ignore these 
elements in favor of an interpretation that looks at the object and 
purpose of the treaty in the broadest sense.  
 
3. Arguing in the Hypothetical 
 
Even if the ICC accepts the ultimately unconvincing 
position that state should be defined contrary to its ordinary 
meaning, the ICC still may not have the authority to accept 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Palestinian application under 12(3).148 
This is because the Oslo Accords limit the scope of the Palestinian 
Authority’s delegable criminal jurisdiction.  Under the Oslo 
Accords the PNA cannot exercise jurisdictions over certain areas 
of the West Bank and, more importantly, over Israeli nationals.149 
Since under Oslo the PNA does not have jurisdiction it cannot 
transfer that jurisdiction to the ICC.150  Indeed, the Al-Haq position 
paper submitted to the ICC admits that, in order to show 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 See Shaw, supra note 31, at ¶ 37 (demonstrating that the object and purpose 
of a treaty cannot be used to alter the clear meaning of terms). 
148 See Fairlie, supra note 21; see also Linda M. Keller, The International 
Criminal Court and Palestine: Part I, JURIST, (Jan. 29, 2013),  
http://jurist.org/forum/2013/01/linda-keller-palestine-icc-part1.php (citing a 
General Assembly decision to upgrade Palestine to “non-member observer 
State” status, though Palestine had not yet achieved statehood status and 
therefore still may not fall under ICC jurisdiction).. 
149 See Shany, supra note 98, at 340–41 (explaining that article IX(5) of the Oslo 
Accords seriously limits the powers of the PNA over Gaza); see also Keller, 
supra note 146 (discussing that Israel is also not a party to the Rome Statute and 
does not fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction). 
150 Shany, supra note 98, at 340–41 (asserting that the PNA efforts to authorize 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction are futile under the Oslo Accords). Shany and 
Shaw also argue that the ICC cannot assert jurisdiction because under Oslo the 
PLO, not the PA, has authority to conduct international relations. This argument 
lacks force because the line between PA and PLO actions in international 
diplomacy has blurred significantly. In any event, the declaration could be more 
accurately characterized as a declaration made by the PA, through the PLO. See 
Dr. Michael Kearney, AL-HAQ POSITION PAPER ON ISSUES ARISING FROM THE 
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY’S SUBMISSION OF A DECLARATION TO THE 
PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT UNDER ARTICLE 12(3) 
OF THE ROME STATUTE at ¶¶ 27–28 (2009), available at 
http://www.alhaq.org/attachments/article/273/position-paper-icc-
(14December2009).pdf (examining the relationship between the PA, the PLO 
and the ICC). 
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Palestinian jurisdiction it must “overcome this prima facie 
obstacle.”151 
In addition to the Oslo Accords, the political reality in Gaza 
poses an obstacle to a jurisdictional argument.  The Palestinian 
Authority has no internal control over Gaza.152  Since 2006 Hamas 
has exercised control over the Gaza strip.153  Despite current 
reconciliation talks, at the time of the declaration Hamas rejected 
the Palestinian Authority and has embarked on a systematic policy 
of persecuting, killing, and expelling PA sympathizers.154  
 
C. Jurisdictional Capacity Does Not Satisfy the 12(3)  
Statehood Requirement 
 
In an argument submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor, 
Al-Haq argues that the ICC can exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
the Palestinian declaration if the Palestinian Authority: 1) Has the 
capacity to enter into international agreements 2) Has the capacity 
to try Palestinians on criminal charges and 3) Has the capacity to 
try Israeli citizens on criminal charges.155 Al-Haq argues that this 
position is “in keeping with the purpose of the Court as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Kearney, supra note 148 at ¶ 32 (analyzing the Palestinian Authority’s 
obstacles to obtain jurisdiction to hold Israelis responsible for criminal acts in 
occupied Palestinian territories).  
152 See Mark Joseph Stern, How Did Hamas Come to Power in Gaza?, SLATE, 
(Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
explainer/2012/11/hamas_in_gaza_how_the_organization_beat_fatah_and_took
_control_of_the_gaza.html (detailing Hamas’s rise to power in Gaza after the 
Palestinian Authority called an election in which Hamas gained control of 
Parliament); see also Palestine, Israel and the UN: Nerves are jangling again, 
THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2012 (indicating the violence between Islamists and 
Palestinians in the Hamas controlled Gaza strip). 
153 See Conal Urquart, Ian Black, et al., Hamas takes Control of Gaza, THE 
GUARDIAN, Jun. 15, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/ 
jun/15/israel4 (reporting the complete takeover of Gaza by Hamas fighters); see 
also Bryony Jones, Q&A: What is Hamas?, CNN, (Nov. 24, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/16/world/meast/hamas-explainer/index.html 
(noting that Hamas first participated in Palestinian parliamentary polls for the 
first time in 2006 which led to their takeover in Gaza). 
154 See Matthew Kalman, Hamas Executes Suspected Fatah Traitors in Gaza, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 22, 2009 (showing Hamas officials 
concession that they are executing innocent Palestinians). 
155 See KEARNEY, supra note 148, at ¶ 23 (proposing that jurisdictional capacity 
affords Palestine the right to grant jurisdiction to the International Criminal 
Court). 
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‘international jurisdictional safety net’ which starts to work when 
national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to deal with the 
crimes committed.”156  Instead of asking whether Palestine is a 
state for the purposes of 12(3), it asks whether Palestine has 
jurisdiction over the alleged crimes, and since the answer is in the 
affirmative, then it can transfer that jurisdiction to the ICC under 
12(3). 
This approach is not supported by any interpretive method 
that conforms to the Vienna Convention.157  To the extent that the 
arguments elucidated above counsel against a functional approach, 
they apply doubly to this suggested reading of 12(3).158  Nothing in 
the Rome Statute, subsequent practice, or drafting history suggests 
that this meaning of state is correct.159  To the extent that the ICC 
is seriously considering this approach, it is worth noting the 
absence of Palestinian jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
Israeli citizens mentioned in Section I.A.3.160 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 See id. (positing that a functional approach be applied to Palestine’s bid for 
statehood). 
157  See INT’L CRIM. CT., SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS ON WHETHER THE 
DECLARATION LODGED BY THE  PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY MEETS 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS (May 3, 2010), available at 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/66e55a4
8cd5049c1852579dc00644adf?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,ICC,Rome,Statute 
(maintaining that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should be 
interpreted narrowly); but see Worster, supra note 20, at 1188 (elucidating that 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can be read to confer statehood 
on Palestine). 
158 Bassiouni, supra note 133 (stating that Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute was 
intended to be read narrowly rather than liberally); see also George P. Fletcher, 
No Jurisdictional Basis for an Investigation Pursuant to the Palestinian 
Declaration, HUMAN RIGHTS & INT’L CRIM. LAW ONLINE FORUM, 
http://uclalawforum.com/gaza  (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (reiterating that 
Palestine was not categorized as a state during the Rome Conference 
establishing the International Criminal Court).  
159  See INT’L CRIM. CT., SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS ON WHETHER THE 
DECLARATION LODGED BY THE  PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY MEETS 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS (May 3, 2010), available at 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/66e55a4
8cd5049c1852579dc00644adf?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,ICC,Rome,Statute 
(noting that the Rome Statute defines statehood by standards of customary 
international law); see also Beoliel & Perry, supra note 43, at 79 (articulating 
that the Rome Statute does not contain provisions transcending the state-based 
system). 
160 See A Question of Security Violence Against Palestinian Women and Girls, 
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 2006, at 1, 19 (reiterating that, under the Oslo 
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As long as the Palestinian Authority does not declare its 
independence there can be no argument that a Palestinian state 
exists.161  Therefore, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction pursuant 
to 12(3) if the term state is understood to carry its ordinary 
meaning.162  Arguments that 12(3) should not carry its ordinary 
meaning are unconvincing.163  The remaining question is whether a 
General Assembly resolution upgrading Palestine to non-member 
state status changes the above-described calculus.164 
 
II. Attainment of Non-Member State Status  
 
This Part argues that attainment of UN non-member status 
does not affect the conclusion that Palestine is not a state for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Accords, Palestinian courts lack jurisdiction over Israeli citizens); see also 
Shany, supra note 98, at 340 (noting that the Oslo Accords limit Palestinian 
courts from imposing jurisdiction over Israelis). 
161 See International Recognition of a Unilaterally Declared Palestinian State: 
Legal and Policy Dilemmas, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
http://jcpa.org/art/becker2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (indicating that the 
Palestinian Authority’s declaration of independence must be based on meeting 
the UN’s requirements for statehood); see also Madeleine Moregenstern, U.N. 
Grants Palestinians Historic Statehood Recognition Status, THE BLAZE, 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/11/29/u-n-grants-palestinians-historic-
statehood-recognition-status/ (Nov. 29, 2012 5:04pm) (reiterating that even 
though Palestine recently obtained nonmember observer state status, that vote 
does not create a Palestine state). 
162  See International Criminal Court – Declarations Article 12(3), 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/ 
structure%20of%20the%20court/registry/Pages/declarations.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2013) (emphasizing access to Article 12(3) exceptions is also limited to 
states); see also Fletcher, supra note 156 (stressing that Palestine does not 
qualify as a “state” under the ICC statutes, a clear requirement for accepting the 
ICC’s jurisdiction). 
163 See Fletcher, supra note 156 (concluding that any argument such argument 
would fall in light of the unequivocal language of ICC requirements); see also 
International Recognition of a Unilaterally Declared Palestinian State: Legal 
and Policy Dilemmas, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
http://jcpa.org/art/becker2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (stating that those 
arguments simply evade the requirements of statehood because Palestine fails to 
satisfy any of the traditional criterions for statehood). 
164 See McMahon & Masters, supra note 17 (reiterating that non-member 
statehood would merely be a symbolic victory for Palestine, because it would 
not have any legal recognition of sovereignty, borders, or full UN membership); 
see also Moregenstern, supra note 159 (finding that non-member states, like 
Palestine, may very well be entitled to access international bodies, including the 
ICC, through this new non-member state status). 
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purpose of the Rome Statute or otherwise confer ICC jurisdiction 
over Palestine’s charges against Israel.  Section II.A argues that 
non-member status does not render Palestine a state under the 
traditional definition.  Section II.B argues that non-member status 
does not alter the conclusion that the functional approach, properly 
applied, mandates the determining that Palestine is not a state. 
 
A. Attainment of Non-Member State Status Does Not Create a 
Palestinian State 
 
As noted above, the consensus approach is that Palestine is 
not a state.165  While United Nations recognition can be important 
in determining statehood, the path to full membership in the United 
Nations runs through the Security Council. 166   The Security 
Council must recommend the admission of a state before the 
General Assembly can vote, by a 2/3 majority, on whether to 
accept a state as a member a full member.167  If Palestine attained 
full state status, that achievement would strongly support 
Palestinian statehood.168  However, President Abbas’ decision to 
avoid the Security Council and instead receive an upgrade from 
observer entity to non-member observer state has little effect on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 See Davenport, supra note 69 (asserting that the only reason Palestine was 
recognized as a non-member state was for political reasons, usurping 
international law requirements for statehood); see also McMahon & Masters, 
supra note 17 (describing major leaders in that consensus against Palestinian 
statehood which include the United States and Israel). 
166 See Davenport, supra note 69 (reiterating the Security Council chose not to 
do so for Palestine); see also Rules of Procedure, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/adms.shtml (providing 
that the Security Council must recommend a new state applicant to the General 
Assembly prior to any vote).  
167 See Fact Sheet: Becoming a New Member State of the United Nations, 
UNITED NATIONS VISITORS CENTRE, http://visit.un.org/wcm/content/site/ 
visitors/lang/en/new_memberstate/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (providing the 
source of the requirements, i.e. Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of UN Charter); see also 
Rules of Procedure, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/adms.shtml (detailing the rubric for the 
General Assembly vote, i.e. applicant’s peaceful relationships with other states 
and ability to carry out UN obligations). 
168 See Crawford, supra note 36, at 311–12 (discussing the status of Palestine in 
the International community as being unclear); see also McMahon & Masters, 
supra note 17 (asserting that non-member state status for Palestine would be a 
large step forward for Palestinians in the international community and a short 
way from member state of the United Nations). 
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Palestine’s status as a state and thus the ICC’s jurisdiction under 
12(3).169  
Arguments for the proposition that the General Assembly 
can recognize Palestine as a State, with an effect that is 
“constitutive, definitive, and universally determinative” are 
ultimately unconvincing.170  When the PLO announced statehood 
in 1988 104 states supported a resolution supporting Palestinian 
statehood.  In the months after that resolution, eighty-nine state 
recognized a Palestinian state.  Since then, the total number of 
states recognizing Palestine as a state has grown to 112 
countries. 171  Despite this broad number of states recognizing 
Palestine, the consensus position was that Palestine did not 
constitute a state.  The General Assembly vote upgrading 
Palestinian observer status was approved by 138 states and largely 
reflected the views of those states that already recognized Palestine 
as a state.172  It did not add the recognition of the several crucial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 See Lauren DeHaan, Palestinian Statehood Bid Passes United Nations Vote, 
CHIMES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.calvin.edu/chimes/2012/12/09/palestinian-
statehood-bid-passes-united-nations-vote/ (characterizing the upgrade as more of 
a symbolic victory than a tangible one); see also McMahon & Masters, supra 
note 17 (quoting a UN statement that the decision elevated Palestine to 
somewhere between a normal observer and a member state, which was a unique 
position). 
170 See Crawford, supra note 36; see also, Joe Lauria et. al., U.N. Gives 
Palestinians ‘State’ Status, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2012, 11:13 PM), (providing 
a statement from the United States arguing that it is impossible to create a state 
with a resolution).  
171 See Haukur Holm, Palestinian Statehood Recognized by More Than 100 
Countries, NAT. POST (Dec. 15, 2011, 10:39 AM), http://news.nationalpost.com 
/2011/12/15/palestinian-statehood-recognized-by-more-than-100-countries/ 
(reporting that at least 112 countries around the world have formally recognized 
Palestine as a state); see also John V. Whitbeck, The State of Palestine Exists, 
MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL (2013), http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-
policy-archives/state-palestine-exists?print (asserting that Palestine qualifies as a 
state because it is recognized as one by 112 states). 
172 See Bronner & Hauser, supra note 24 (stating that Palestine has been 
upgraded to observer status in a 138-9 vote); see also A List of Nations Which 
Voted For, Against, or Abstained on Granting Non-Member State Status in the 
UN, AL-JAZEERAH: CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://www.ccun.org/News/2012%20News%20Links.htm (follow “November 
2012 News Links” hyperlink; then follow hyperlink under “November 29, 2012) 
(listing the 138 states that approved of Palestine attaining observer status). 
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states that do not recognize Palestine as a state such as the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany.173 
This is not to say that a General Assembly resolution 
carries no importance.174  Rather, it is to point out that in this case 
the General Assembly recognition is of little import since the 
recognition demonstrates only a slightly greater support for 
Palestinian statehood.175  Even under a declarative model that 
recognizes the political importance of state recognition, this greater 
recognition is insufficient to alter the facts on the ground that 
caused the leading scholars to conclude that Palestine was not a 
state prior to the General Assembly declaration.176  Additionally, 
under a constitutive theory of statehood the General Assembly vote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 See Lauria et. al., supra note 168 (relaying that the United States feels that 
Palestine’s recognition of a raised status is an obstacle to peace and that a state 
cannot be created where none exists); see also A List of Nations Which Voted 
For, Against, or Abstained on Granting Non-Member State Status in the UN., 
supra note 170 (including the United States and Canada as voting against the 
upgrade and Germany and the United Kingdom as abstaining from voting). 
174 See Mark Memmott, What Will a U.N. Upgrade Mean for Palestinians?, 
NPR (Nov. 29, 2012, 8:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2012/11/29/166144480/what-will-an-u-n-upgrade-mean-for-palestinians 
(stating that obtaining non-member observer status at the U.N. allows Palestine 
to file cases with the International Criminal Court); see also UN Upgrades 
Palestinian Status, Bolstering Statehood Claim, NBCNEWS.COM, 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/29/15546351-un-upgrades-
palestinian-status-bolstering-statehood-claim?lite (Nov. 29, 2012, 3:26 PM) 
(suggesting Palestine’s new status at the U.N. may afford it standing to use the 
International Criminal Court and other international legislative bodies). 
175 See US Objects to “State of Palestine” Title, ANADOLU AGENCY, Jan. 24, 
2013, http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/125418--us-objected-quot-state-of-
palestine-quot-title  (indicating U.S. ambassador Rice does not recognize the 
General Assembly’s vote acknowledging Palestine as a state); see also Marc 
Pitzke, Palestinian Recognition Marks Triumph over Israel, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
INT’L (Nov. 30, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world 
/palestinians-granted-non-member-observer-status-at-united-nations-a-
870150.html (opining that the General Assembly’s vote grants Palestine only the 
right to speak at the U.N. and that nothing else will change because of 
Americans’ permanent veto at the U.N. Security Council). 
176 See Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., Comment, Admission of “Palestine” as a Member 
of a Specialized Agency and Withholding the Payment of Assessments in 
Response, 84 AM. J. INT’L. L. 218, 219–20 (1990) (concluding that Palestine 
does not meet the requirements for statehood because it lacks defined borders 
and complete control over the claimed territory); see also Predictable 
Preoccupations, MIDEAST MIRROR, June 29, 2011 (arguing there are 4 
preconditions for statehood, and that Palestine does not meet them because it 
does not rule an entire population within a designated territory). 
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carries little weight.177  Of the major players in the Palestinian 
peace process only France added itself to the ranks of states that 
recognize a Palestinian state.178   
The only importance of the General Assembly resolution 
on Palestine was, surprisingly, not the outcome of the vote on that 
resolution, but the very fact that the Palestinian Authority 
requested to be recognized as a state.179  In doing so it proclaimed 
its view that it is an independent state.180  In so doing, it openly and 
clearly declared that it views itself as a state.181  This is critical 
because, as discussed in Section II.B.2, many commentators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 See Thomas D. Grant, International Responsibility and the Admission of 
States to the United Nations, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1095, 1155–57 (2009) 
(indicating that although membership at the U.N. may function as a collective 
recognition of statehood, it does not create a state); see also State of Palestine 
Name Change Shows Limitations, USA TODAY (Jan. 7, 2013, 9:06 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/07/state-palestine-
name/1816083/ (opining that Palestine’s symbolic recognition at the U.N. does 
not alter its status because Palestine cannot exert full control over the West 
Bank). 
178 See Clare Byrne, France to Support Palestinian Statehood at UN, DPA INT’L 
SERV. IN ENGLISH, Nov. 27, 2012 (expressing the French president would 
support Palestine’s U.N. bid to be recognized as a non-member state); see also 
U.N. General Assembly, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord 
Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations; Objective to 
‘Breath New Life’ Into the Peace Process, Says Palestinian President; Israel’s 
Delegate Counters, Without Direct Negotiations, Peace Remains ‘Out of Reach’ 
(Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2012/ga11317.doc.htm 
(displaying France voted in favor of Palestine as a non-member observer state). 
179 See Daoud Kuttab, Abbas’ Newfound Courage, PALESTINE NEWS NETWORK, 
Jan. 11, 2013 (showing that after a winning bid to be recognized as a non-
member observer state, Abbas widened his reach by representing all Palestinians 
and not just those residing at the West Bank); see also Early Start with John 
Berman and Zoraida Sambolin: Fiscal Cliff Finger-Pointing; Palestinians Win 
Historic U.N. Recognition (CNN television broadcast Nov. 30, 2012) (alleging 
the vote at the General Assembly strengthened the image of the Palestinian 
Authority, which had been injured by the violence in Gaza). 
180 See Hume & Fantz, supra note 8 (acknowledging that the Palestinian 
Authority declared a bid to be recognized as an independent state to the U.N. 
General Assembly); see also CNN Wire Staff, Palestinian President Requests 
Statehood; Israel Calls for Talks, CNN.COM (Sept. 23, 2011, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/23/world/meast/un-middle-east/index.html (stating 
that the Palestinian Authority’s bid for independence was their 
acknowledgement of independence). 
181 See Hume & Fantz, supra note 8; see also CNN Wire Staff, supra note 178 
(stating that the Palestinian Authority’s bid for independence was their 
acknowledgement of independence). 
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argued that until Palestine declared itself an independent state any 
discussion of whether Palestine meets the criterion for statehood 
was premature.182  
However, even this aspect of a General Assembly 
resolution is not of great importance.183  President Abbas already 
declared that the Palestinian Authority views itself as governing an 
independent Palestinian state on September 23, 2011 when he 
submitted an application for full member status in the UN to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations. In this application he 
declared: “I have the profound honour, on behalf of the Palestinian 
people, to submit this application of the State of Palestine for 
admission to membership in the United Nations.” 184   While 
President Abbas noted that, “the State of Palestine affirms its 
commitment to the achievement of a just, lasting and 
comprehensive resolution of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict based 
on the vision of two-States living side by side in peace and 
security” he also signaled that the Palestinian Authority was no 
longer operating under the Oslo framework.185  Instead, it would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 See Ronen, supra note 50, at 3 (illustrating scholars’ reluctance to discuss 
Palestinian statehood because the Palestinians had not yet declared 
independence); see also Robert Satloff, Don’t Legitimate Arafatistan, WALL ST. 
J., June 19, 2002, at A18 (noting that Palestine could not be a state without a 
declaration of independence). 
183 See Isabel Kershner, Israel Heightens Warnings Over Palestinians’ U.N. Bid, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world 
/middleeast/israel-heightens-warnings-over-palestinians-un-bid.html (arguing 
that the vote will only illicit moral support for statehood); see also Jordan 
Sekulow & Matthew Clark, The Legal Impossibility of Limited Palestinian 
Statehood at the U.N., WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2012, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/religious-right-now/post/the-legal-
impossibility-of- imited-palestinian-statehood-at-the-un/2012/11/28/96697738-
39a6-11e2-b01f-5f55b193f58f_blog.html (asserting that the U.N. bid cannot 
grant statehood under international law). 
184 See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated  Sept. 23, 2011 from the President 
of Palestine to the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. S/2011/592 (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://unispal.un.org/ UNISPAL NSF/0/ F6CF1ED25A5D8FE9852579170050C 
37F (documenting the Palestinian Authority’s bid to the U.N.); see also Neil 
MacFarquhar & Steven Lee Myers, Palestinians Request U.N. Status; Powers 
Press for Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/09/24/world/palestinians-submit-statehood-bid-at-un.html?pagewanted=all 
(demonstrating that the Palestinian Authority had requested U.N. status and 
recognition). 
185 See Kershner, supra note 181 (alleging that the Palestinian bid could lead to a 
termination of the Oslo Accords); see also Chris McGreal, Palestinians Warn: 
Back UN Statehood Bid or Risk Boosting Hamas, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 
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seek to negotiate a lasting peace from a position of statehood, not 
with the aspiration of becoming a state.186 
The General Assembly resolution upgrading Palestine to a 
non-member state status thus has little effect on ICC jurisdiction 
pursuant to 12(3).187  The criteria for statehood were either met or 
not met prior to the General Assembly’s vote.188  The vote did little 
to change the existing calculus prior to the vote.189 
 
B. Importance of Attaining Non-Member State Status  
 
Attainment of non-member state status does not support 
interpreting state so as to include non-state entities.190  In fact, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2012, 14:04 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/27/palestinians-
un-statehood-bid-hamas/print (noting that the Palestinian’s bid threatened the 
Oslo Accords). 
186  See Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, The Legal and Policy 
Implications of the Possibility of Palestinian Statehood, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L 
L. & POL'Y 343, 407 (2012) (highlighting the sovereign control Israel enjoyed 
over Palestine under the Oslo Accords); see also Abbas’ Speech to the UN 
General Assembly, November 2012, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (last updated Nov. 
29, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/palestinian-authority/abbas-speech-un-general-
assembly-november-2012/p29579 (stating the President’s intention to affirm the 
legitimacy of the State of Palestine). 
187 See Shaw, supra note 46, at 301 (indicating that non-state entities cannot 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC); see also George P. Fletcher, Don’t Go There, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23iht-
edfletcher.html (arguing that only “full-blooded states” can accept 
the jurisdiction of the ICC under the Rome Statute).  
188 See Dajani, supra note 91, at 81 (referencing a criteria for statehood widely 
accepted among the international community); see also Iain Scobbie, Alon 
Margalit & Sarah Hibbin, Recognizing Palestinian Statehood, YALE J. INT’L 
AFF. (Aug. 25, 2011), available at http://yalejournal.org/2011/08/recognizing-
palestinian-statehood/ (referring to Palestine’s failure to meet all criteria for 
statehood under the Montevideo convention). 
189 See General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine Non-
Member Observer State Status in United Nations, General Assembly, U.N. DOC. 
GA/11317 (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs 
/2012/ga11317.doc.htm (referencing the lack of confidence representatives had 
on the vote’s effect); see also Cerone, supra note 13 (presenting the General 
Assembly resolution as symbolic rather than significant for Palestinians). 
190 See Permanent Observers, UNITED NATIONS (last visited Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/en/members/aboutpermobservers.shtml (indicating that 
becoming a non-member state observer is based purely on practice); see also 
Victoria Nuland, Interview with United Nations Representatives, U.S. DEP’T ST. 
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/11/201168.htm 
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the extent that attainment of non-member state status moves 
Palestine closer to recognized statehood it counsels against a 
divergent reading of “state.”191  The alternate readings clearly 
depart from the ordinary meaning of the term state and there is 
ample evidence that the drafters intended “state” to carry its 
ordinary meaning. 192   The closer Palestine is to achieving 
statehood, the closer it is to being able to accept ICC 
jurisdiction.193  The ICC should refrain from doing injustice to the 
clearest reading of the Rome Statute in order to hold Israel 
accountable since it will likely be able to move forward in the near 
future without endorsing an alternative reading that is unfaithful to 
the clear language of the Rome Statute.194 
To the extent that the Oslo Accords serve as a bar to the 
assertion of ICC jurisdiction, the Palestinian application to join the 
UN as a full member should remove that obstacle.195 Such an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
#ISRAEL (indicating that attainment of such status might even interfere with 
Palestine’s quest for statehood). 
191 See Grant, supra note 175, at 1167–69 (referring to a U.N. membership as the 
conclusive evidence of the statehood of an admitted entity); see also Thomas, 
supra note 76, at 223–24 (highlighting that permanent observers of non-member 
States lack any officially recognized status). 
192 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15-17, 1998, 
A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III), art. 3, part 2  (indicating that the ordinary meaning 
of “state” was meant to apply in the Rome Statute, as evidenced by a lack of 
explanation otherwise); see also Drozd v. France, App. No. 12747/87, 14 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. 745, ¶ 89 (1992), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe. 
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57774 (providing an example of how 
Courts read ‘state’ in accord with its ordinary meaning). 
193 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 3 (asserting that Palestine’s declaration of state 
status brings it under ICC jurisdiction); see also Fairlie, supra note 21 (stating 
that Palestine’s newer status is likely but not certain to make it susceptible to 
ICC jurisdiction). 
194 See Beoliel & Perry, supra note 43 (explaining that in the occasion that 
Palestine is considered to fall under ICC jurisdiction, the ICC Prosecutor can 
demand that international criminals be tried); see also George Bisharat, Op-Ed., 
Why Palestine Should Take Israel to Court in the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/opinion/why-palestine-
should-take-israel-to-court-in-the-hague.html?_r=0 (opining that Israel would 
expose itself to liability for its international crimes if the ICC considers Palestine 
a state for purposes of jurisdiction). 
195 See Pellet, supra note 90, at 993 (asserting that Palestine’s conformance with 
the Oslo Accords does not mean that Palestine forgoes its right to self-
determination of state status); see also Worster, supra note 20, at 1203 (noting 
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application, which contradicts the obligations undertaken under 
Oslo, signals that those who question the continuing validity of 
Oslo196 are likely correct.  Once again, however, it is not the 
outcome of the vote that is of importance; rather the crucial act 
occurred when Palestine submitted its application to the Secretary 
General.197 
CONCLUSION 
 
The International Criminal Court cannot assert jurisdiction 
over alleged war crimes in Palestine since Palestine is not a state 
and Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute requires statehood before an 
international entity can recognize ICC jurisdiction.  Article 12(3) 
employs the ordinary meaning of “state” which requires statehood 
under traditional concepts of international law.  Even if it 
employed a functional definition of “state” a proper application of 
the functional approach excludes the possibility of Palestinian 
statehood.  The fact that the General Assembly recognized 
Palestine as a non-state entity does not change Palestine’s non-
state status, and it does not allow the ICC to extend jurisdiction 
under Palestine’s attempted 12(3) declaration. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that through self-recognition Palestine has the power to accede to treaties and 
ICC jurisdiction irrespective of the Oslo Accords). 
196 See Louis René Beres, Why the Oslo Accords Should be Abrogated by Israel, 
12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 267, 267 (providing one example of the view that 
the Oslo Accords should be abrogated); see also Shany, supra note 98, at 342 
(noting that there is some doubt as to whether Oslo still has binding force). 
197 See Hume & Fantz, supra note 8 (explaining that Palestine’s application to 
the United Nation is of significant importance); see also Isabel Kershner, 
Palestinians Try to Rally Support, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, at A6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/middleeast/palestinians-renew-push-
for-enhanced-un-status.html (expressing that Palestine’s application to the U.N. 
was of noteworthy importance to its recognition as a state).  
